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Abstract 
 
Locating Epistemic Value 
 
Brian William Pollex, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Supervisor:  Sinan Dogramaci 
 
Abstract: Many epistemologists are attracted to the idea that knowledge is valuable 
in a way that stands out when compared to the value of other doxastic attitudes. Some 
philosophers, including Linda Zagzebski, Jonathan Kvanvig, Richard Swinburne, and 
Duncan Pritchard have objected to contemporary theories of knowledge on the grounds 
that the analyses these theories offer fail to sufficiently distinguish knowledge from mere 
true belief. One particularly clear instance of this is the Swamping Problem for Process 
Reliabilism. Goldman and Olsson try to respond to the Swamping Problem on behalf of 
Reliabilism. In what follows, I first try to motivate and defend an approach to epistemic 
value. Then I review the Swamping Problem and evaluate Goldman and Olsson’s response 
to it. Finding their response unsatisfying, I suggest that we try to satisfy Zagzebski et al. 
by introducing a theory of understanding which answers to the intuitions many endorse 
about epistemic value. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I.1 Kvanvig and Goldman & Olsson 
Much of mainstream contemporary epistemology has been occupied with crafting 
a satisfactory account of knowledge. Comparatively little has been said about what it is 
that makes knowledge valuable. This is somewhat surprising given the overwhelming 
volume of work that has been produced giving increasingly complex counterexamples, 
revisions, and re-revisions of competitor theories of knowledge.  
Although epistemic value is an appealing topic, there is an obvious obstacle in the 
way of serious investigation. How can we productively inquire into the value of knowledge 
without anything even approximating a consensus on the correct theory of knowledge, or 
even the kind of value knowledge would have if the correct theory were in place?1 In The 
Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, Jonathan Kvanvig offers an implicit 
methodological suggestion by proceeding piecemeal, discussing several serious contender 
theories in turn. My project is in part an endorsement of this approach. 
Kvanvig considers whether or not Process Reliabilism (hereafter sometimes simply 
Reliabilism) is compatible with a plausible account of the value of knowledge. He uses 
Reliabilism as a test case for Externalist theories of knowledge, and suggests that 
conclusions he draws about Reliabilism can be extended (with minor alterations) to other 
species of the Externalist genus. Kvanvig argues that no satisfying account of epistemic 
value is forthcoming from the Reliabilist, and so suggests that prospects look dim for 
Externalism more generally. He also suggests that certain Internalist theories might have 
                                                
1 Kvanvig and others have defended the view that knowledge has “categorical” value (Kvanvig 2003) while 
prefer alternative accounts of the nature of knowledge’s value. See Section 1.1 for more discussion. 
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access to more promising theoretical tools for explaining epistemic value. He concludes 
with a tentative investigation of whether Understanding, a different epistemic state than 
knowledge, might fare better than knowledge as the bearer of epistemic value.2  
So far as the Externalist, and specifically the Reliabilist, is concerned, Kvanvig’s 
picture looks like this: on Externalist theories of knowledge, like Reliabilism, knowledge 
is not plausibly thought of as distinctively epistemically valuable.3 But an Externalist 
theory of knowledge (like Reliabilism) might be paired with or supplemented with an 
account of another kind of epistemic state, for example, Understanding, which might be 
the actual bearer of the distinctive epistemic value we had hoped to locate in knowledge.  
In order to push this line, Kvanvig relies on an argument presented by Linda 
Zagzebski and several others usually called the Swamping problem.4 Kvanvig’s agenda in 
his book is broad, but his treatment of the Swamping problem in particular has garnered 
response. In their 2009 paper Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge, Alvin Goldman and 
Erik J. Olsson respond on behalf of Reliabilism to the Swamping problem as presented by 
Kvanvig and others. Goldman and Olsson attempt to show that adopting a Process 
Reliabilist theory of knowledge is compatible with holding that knowledge has a special 
value, albeit of a different kind than Kvanvig is after. Goldman and Olsson’s piece itself 
                                                
2 Depending on how one conceives of the task at hand, this may seem very unsatisfying; if one takes the 
issue to be the narrow matter of discovering what it is that makes knowledge valuable, then of course 
investigation of any other epistemic state is a waste of time. But there is a broader way to understand 
interest in epistemic value. See Section 1.2 for discussion of the move from the Guiding Intuition to the 
Weak Guiding Intuition. 
3 More on what it means to be “distinctively epistemically valuable” will follow in Section 1.1. 
4 Swinburne and Zagzebski each discuss related earlier versions of the problem, Swinburne in his 1998 
book Providence and the Problem of Evil and Zagzebski in her 1996 book Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry 
into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Ward Jones is credited with a version 
of the problem in 1997. By Kvanvig 2003 the problem was well known, and Goldman and Olsson 2009 
compare several versions of the swamping problem.   
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has spawned further discussion about the prospects for Reliabilism with regard to epistemic 
value.5  
 
I.2 Structure and Aims 
My work here will be broken up into four main sections. In chapters one and two I 
will explain and defend my approach to the literature on epistemic value. After this, I have 
two principal aims. In chapter three, I will show that Goldman and Olsson’s Conditional 
Probability Solution does not satisfactorily respond to the Swamping Problem, leaving 
Process Reliabilism facing a serious issue with regards to epistemic value. In chapter four, 
I will propose an account of Understanding which I take to be  well-suited to a partnered 
role for theories of knowledge like Reliabilism.  
As mentioned above, my project is methodologically in the spirit of Kvanvig’s, 
although my own views are in some ways less radical than his and in other ways more. 
Unlike Kvanvig, I will constrain my remarks to Reliabilism directly rather than attempting 
to extend them to cover all possible Externalist approaches. In this respect my goals are 
more modest. However my views about the role of Understanding for the Reliabilist are 
somewhat more strident than Kvanvig’s. Rather than just raising the possibility that certain 
Externalist theories of knowledge might be supplemented by an epistemic value-bearing 
account of Understanding, I will offer a more detailed, substantial proposal for the kind of 
epistemic state that would be best suited to play this partnered role for Reliabilism.  
Before beginning in earnest, I should note that Process Reliabilism does face 
serious and well-known extensional objections, with pressure coming from both directions. 
Cases like BonJour’s Norman suggest to some that reliability does not suffice for 
                                                
5 See the exchanges between Olsson, Jager, and others in Theoria. 
 4 
 
justification, and proponents of Demon-World style objections oppose the necessity of 
reliability for justification. There are also other pressing issues for Reliabilism simply qua 
theory of knowledge, like the Generality problem. 
That said, I will not be directly addressing objections to Process Reliabilism qua 
theory of knowledge, as I am not attempting to motivate the acceptance of Reliabilism. I 
will discuss the Generality Problem in section 3.4, but only because of a connection to the 
debate over epistemic value. Relatedly, though many contributors6 to the literature note 
that a Gettier condition is needed in order to give the most plausible version of a Reliability 
theory of knowledge, in the context of the debate over epistemic value most (though not 
all) have preferred to focus on a simplified version of the view that omits this condition in 
order to focus more narrowly on the relevant aspects of the theory.7 I will do likewise.  
These considerations raise an important question. Why focus on a simplified 
version of a beleaguered view? Like Kvanvig, I think an Externalist approach to the theory 
of knowledge is well-supported on grounds independent of epistemic value, and that 
because of this, serious consideration of Reliabilism--even simplified Reliabilism--is a 
promising way to make progress with developing issues in the debate over epistemic value. 
One strong reason to favor an externalist approach in the theory of knowledge has to do 
with dialectical pressure to get certain cases right: non-inferential knowledge, perceptual 
knowledge, and other cases involving non-reflecting or unsophisticated agents suggest that 
any account requiring cognitively sophisticated conditions be met in order for one to know, 
is likely to be highly revisionary for that very reason. An externalist account that merely 
                                                
6 Goldman and Olsson, Kvanvig, Jager, Zagzebski, etc.  
7 Goldman and Olsson write that, “...the idea of knowledge depending on the existence of a reliable 
connection is the central one behind reliabilism, and it would be unfortunate for the theory if that very 
component failed to produce an added value” (2009, pg. 155). For a contrasting approach, Riggs holds that 
the Gettier condition may be a feature of interest to philosophers hoping to make progress on questions of 
epistemic value. Georgi Gardiner (2017) argues that the modal features of some accounts could not explain 
knowledge’s value.  
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constrains belief formation or the modal profile of a given belief seems more likely to 
capture these important cases. And Reliabilism, though it faces difficulties, is one such 
view.   
Whether one prefers a sophisticated Reliabilist account of knowledge, such as the 
Agent- or Virtue-Reliabilist theories, some other Externalist account of knowledge, an 
Internalist account, or (perhaps like BonJour, Alston, or on my reading, Klein) is skeptical 
of unified accounts of knowledge,8 the debate that has developed around Reliabilism is 
instructive. It offers a relatively clear opportunity to see how several major figures think 
about the connection between knowledge, true belief, and epistemic value.   
In chapter four I will turn to the positive part of my project: presenting an account 
of Understanding that I regard as distinctively epistemically valuable. My hope is that this 
suggestion will be made more intriguing than it would be were it totally free-standing by 
offering it as an extension of a familiar (if not widely endorsed) theory of knowledge, and 
an extension which ameliorates a serious concern for that view.  
Unfortunately, like knowledge, the proper analysis of Understanding is hotly 
debated. On some prominent views, Understanding is a special kind of knowledge--but 
only in the sense of having a specific topic, and not special in the sense of being more 
difficult to acquire than knowledge of other topics. On these views, very roughly, 
understanding is knowledge of causes.9 I take it that this is meant to capture the intuitive 
idea that, at least in many cases, to understand something is to know why that thing is the 
case, or why that proposition is true.  
                                                
8 See Alston’s 2005 book Beyond "Justification": Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation for more 
information about his view. Klein’s infinitism is meant, on my view, primarily to capture what he calls 
“adult human knowledge”. This leaves him without a clear response to “animal knowledge” cases. See his 
1999 paper, “Human knowledge and the infinite regress of reasons”. 
9 See Kvanvig’s 2003 discussion of propositional understanding; compare Elgin and Riggs’ Appendices C 
and D to Haddock, Millar & Pritchard’s 2009 collection Epistemic Value.  
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On other views understanding is a relationship between an agent and a domain, 
subject, topic, or craft (e.g., physics), rather than an individual proposition. On these views 
understanding in its epistemic guise is primarily related to the phenomenon inquired after 
or reported about with sentences like “does anyone here understand calculus?”, or “Hannah 
really understands contemporary U.S. politics”. Some (usually, but not only, members of 
the first camp) have argued that Understanding is factive while others (usually but not only 
members of the second camp) hold that it is best understood to be non-factive or “indirectly 
factive”.10  
While I will be discussing a non-propositional, non-factive account of 
Understanding and will discuss some intuitions and examples that I take to motivate such 
an account, I do not intend to try to argue that this is the best or only plausible analysis of 
an epistemic state denoted by our use of the word ‘understanding’. This is because I take 
it that ‘understanding’ has familiar, entrenched, properly epistemic uses, some of which 
are propositional (e.g., “Claire finally understood that it is wrong to break promises without 
a good reason”) and others which are non-propositional or only propositional in an indirect 
sense (e.g., “Sarah really understands calculus”).11  
I do not advocate a non-propositional, non-factive account of understanding as the 
correct analysis of (epistemic) understanding tout court, but I do think that the state referred 
to by the non-propositional, non-factive uses of ‘understanding’ (ie., objectual 
understanding) is the best candidate for the epistemic state that bears an epistemic value 
distinctive from that borne by states like knowledge and mere true belief.12 
                                                
10 See Zagzebski (2001). 
11 That is, indirectly propositional by virtue of being related to propositions indirectly, while being directly 
related to e.g. a group of propositions. A state that is indirectly propositional in this sense is propositional 
by virtue of being (indirectly) related to propositions, but fails to be directly propositional by directly 
relating agents to an object that is not itself a proposition (generally, a body of propositions).  
12 See also section 2.1. 
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 I hope to lessen the potential impact of some of these complications by presenting 
the non-factive, non-propositional account as a doxastic state especially well-suited to 
complement a Reliabilist (or other externalist) theory of knowledge when it comes to 
questions of epistemic value. Having argued that certain analyses of knowledge 
(specifically Reliabilist ones) fail to satisfy some forceful intuitions about epistemic value, 
my proposal is not to abandon an independently well-motivated theory of knowledge just 
because that theory fits poorly with some desiderata, but instead to move to a more 
ecumenical epistemology by complementing a well-supported theory of knowledge with 
an account of understanding, where the latter does satisfy (a version of) the value-theoretic 
desiderata that our otherwise well-supported theory of knowledge fails to vindicate. In this 
way we can hopefully both have and eat our cake.  
In short, my proposal is to respond to the difficulties presented by questions of 
epistemic value in a positive, rather than negative, way. Rather than wielding intuitions 
about value as objections to popular, well-supported theories of knowledge, I think that our 
interest in (and familiarity with) epistemic value ought to guide our epistemic theorizing, 
even if this takes us some distance away from familiar questions about knowledge.  
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LOCATING EPISTEMIC VALUE 
Chapter 1: How to Think About Epistemic Value 
1.1 The Guiding Intuition 
Suppose, for the sake of expository simplicity and harmony with the existing 
literature, that there are such things are propositions roughly as many philosophers take 
there to be, and that the sorts of things they get up to are the sorts of things many hold that 
they do: they are abstracta, can feature in thought, are the objects of our beliefs, can be 
expressed by utterances, and are the proper bearers of truth and falsity. In addition to belief, 
they are also the objects to which we bear other propositional attitudes. For some 
proposition P, we might hope that P, fear that P, withhold from P, believe that P, disbelieve 
or reject that P, accept or suppose that P,13 predict that P, and so on.14 More contentiously, 
we might understand that P.15 Leaving aside understanding, each of belief, disbelief or 
rejection, acceptance or supposition, and prediction are examples of doxastic propositional 
attitudes, a term I understand to mean belief-like: related to an epistemic commitment, in 
one sense or another, that the world is thus-and-so, is or is not or might be as P says it is.  
It is crucial to following this debate to notice at the outset that the relevant literature 
is organized around an investigation into doxastic propositional attitudes. To the extent that 
                                                
13 See Patrick (1990) for discussion of Van Fraassen’s notion of acceptance and the debate over its relation 
to belief.  
14 There are several substantive debates about the nature of propositions and belief that raise deep and 
interesting questions about, for example, whether or not propositions figure in thought, or whether beliefs 
should be thought of as some form of inner assent, a way of taking the world to be thus-and-so, or instead 
as mere dispositions to act in certain ways. Largely because of the developing nature of the literature on 
epistemic value, these questions and others seem to have been set aside in order to try to make progress in 
laying out the fundamental issues at stake in this debate. This does not mean that these questions do not 
bear on the inquiry into epistemic value; on the contrary, they represent open avenues for future research. 
Generally though I will keep to this simplified picture for ease of exposition and consonance with the 
existing literature. 
15 The notion of understanding in play here and in the remainder of the piece is epistemic rather than 
linguistic. 
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there is contemporary discussion of the older (ancient) picture of epistemic value or virtue, 
on which wisdom or some other character trait is the chief epistemic virtue, this discussion 
is largely separate from the investigation I am joining into doxastic propositional attitudes. 
I’d like to remain neutral on the issue of epistemic virtue in this sense in this piece. For my 
own part, I take it to be an obvious truth that some people are wise and some foolish, and 
that this judgment is at least as clearly evaluative as it is epistemic. It seems very plausible 
that a complete picture of what it is to do well epistemically must include some explanation 
of this and perhaps other epistemic virtues. I feel similarly about the view that rationality 
holds some special place in the epistemic domain. My aim here is not to furnish a complete 
picture of epistemic value. I merely wish to clarify the nature of the value borne by different 
doxastic propositional attitudes--specifically, to propose a shift in our attention away from 
knowledge.  
Many epistemologists are attracted to the idea that, among the doxastic 
propositional attitudes, knowledge is valuable. Some would go even further, claiming that 
knowledge is not just valuable, but distinctively epistemically valuable—valuable in a way 
not shared by other doxastic states. Due to the important motivational role this intuition 
seems to play in the literature on epistemic value, I’ll call this the Guiding Intuition. 
 
Guiding Intuition: Knowledge is a distinctively epistemically valuable state. 
 
This formulation is meant to capture the sense many epistemologists seem to have, 
which some explicitly state, that knowledge is preeminent in terms of value in the epistemic 
domain, while also being acceptable to philosophers (for example, epistemic virtue 
theorists) who prefer a more inclusive overall picture of the epistemic with room for, and 
indeed high esteem for, states like wisdom. So long as such theorists conceive of 
 10 
knowledge as having a value that is unique among the doxastic attitudes and for that reason 
distinctive from the value that inheres in other features (e.g., wisdom, rationality), such 
theorists should also be able to accept the Guiding Intuition.  
While I take it to be valuable to identify a common ground shared between such 
diverse epistemological approaches, if agreement is limited to the Guiding Intuition, then 
that agreement will not be particularly informative. The specific sense of value at stake in 
the Guiding Intuition remains unclear even taking for granted a traditional theory of 
knowledge.16 Without even a sketch of the kind of value one imputes to knowledge, it is 
unclear how to determine whether this value is actually distinctive or not. One extremely 
modest thesis would be that at least some knowledge is sometimes instrumentally or 
extrinsically valuable for certain people, given that those people have certain (perhaps very 
common) psychological dispositions and practical aims. A very ambitious alternative that 
might also be defended would be the view that all knowledge is finally or intrinsically 
valuable. Either of these proposals, if combined with a reason to think that this value is 
distinct from that associated with other doxastic attitudes, would vindicate the Guiding 
Intuition.  
To be clear, vindicating the Guiding Intuition in this way is not the approach of all 
disputants in the literature. Kvanvig, for example, conceives of our task as finding out what 
makes knowledge “categorically” valuable: that is, valuable just in virtue of being 
knowledge. And surely a class of epistemic states could have a value that is distinctive 
without this value being categorical in Kvanvig’s sense. (For example, if only knowledge 
had some special epistemic value, but not all cases of knowledge had this feature.) It seems 
clear that the categorical value Kvanvig has in mind will also be distinctive in my sense. 
                                                
16 By this I mean taking for granted a belief-first, rather than knowledge-first, analysis. More discussion of 
the implications of a knowledge-first framework will be discussed in section 2.1. 
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So it is clear that Kvanvig is not quite animated by the Guiding Intution, although he does 
seem motivated by a deeply related intuition, one that seems even more demanding than 
the Guiding Intuition.  
For their part, Goldman and Olsson suggest instead that we should aim to show that 
knowledge is valuable in what they call a “generic” sense, admitting of some (but not 
many) counterexamples.17 While they strive to show that (reliabilist) knowledge is more 
valuable than mere true belief, they do not specifically claim that the value of this state is 
distinctive, although it seems to me that Olsson at least would be friendly to the 
suggestion.18 So while neither party has explicitly endorsed the Guiding Intuition, it seems 
fair to characterize it as neutral territory in this dispute.  
There is a challenge to Kvanvig’s categorical approach related to so-called “junk 
beliefs” or “junk knowledge”, the inspiration for which is usually attributed to Harman.19 
If one takes this or other related problems seriously one might move away from the idea 
that knowledge is categorically valuable and instead hold that only some kinds or classes 
of knowledge (the non-junky ones) are valuable. (Such a view could be similar to the 
“generic” view endorsed by Goldman and Olsson.) A respect for the Harmanian “junk” 
problem combined with the conviction that knowledge is special within the epistemic 
domain is the straightforward reason to frame the Guiding Intuition as I have. Further, since 
the categorical value interpretation is controversial and since I mean for the Guiding 
                                                
17 Their support for this claim consists of an appeal to dispositions to assent to natural language claims by 
ordinary users. It is worth noting that, as Goldman and Olsson are well aware, their approach will not 
deliver the stronger result, sought after by Kvanvig and others, that knowledge is categorically valuable. 
For a challenge related to the categorical value view, see discussion of the problem posed by so-called 
“junk beliefs” in section 2.4. 
18 Goldman’s preferred response in the 2009 Goldman and Olsson paper (called “Value Autonomization”) 
to epistemic value claims is to provide a sort of epistemic error theory, and so it does not seem likely that 
he would endorse the Guiding Intuition. 
19 Though Harman’s discussion in his 1986 book Change in View helped frame the debate, many others 
have contributed since then including important recent work, e.g. Jane Friedman (2018). 
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Intuition to have broad appeal, I prefer not burden the Guiding Intuition with the categorical 
value claim.  
I introduced the Guiding Intuition because I think the most useful way to conceive 
of the literature on the value of knowledge is as an attempt to precisify the Guiding Intuition 
by discovering what kinds of value inhere in knowledge. Some distinctions will better 
equip us for our search. We will need the familiar distinction between intrinsic (or final) 
value and extrinsic (or relational) value.20 I will follow Michael Zimmerman in 
characterizing intrinsic value as value some thing or state has “in itself,” “as such,” “for its 
own sake,” or “in its own right”, and characterizing extrinsic value as “value that is not 
intrinsic”. This way of dividing up the terrain, though exhaustive, is not particularly 
informative. We can say more about extrinsic value. 
 Instrumental value is one familiar kind of extrinsic value. Roughly, something has 
instrumental value given that it is a means or instrument to attaining something else of 
value. For example, a ticket to a baseball game might have instrumental value for me if it 
was a convenient means toward my goal of watching the game. In this example, I do not 
value the ticket in itself, nor is it intrinsically valuable, but it is instrumentally valuable as 
an instrument or means to something else I aim for. 
We will also need recourse to the notion of indicator value, a second class of 
extrinsic value. Something, for example, medical test results, have indicator value when 
they indicate the presence of something of intrinsic value, for example, health. The test 
results are not a means to health, but they signify its presence. These distinctions in hand, 
we can return shortly to the Guiding Intuition and our attempt to precisify it. First, I’d like 
                                                
20 Although these two pairs of terms generally go together, there are edge cases in which, for example, 
something is finally valued for its extrinsic or relational properties, such as the familiar case of Princess 
Diana’s dress. See Korsgaard (1983).  
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to gesture to the motivations for proposals like the Guiding Intuition, and then briefly 
address a different approach to epistemic value. 
1.2 Why Accept Something Like the Guiding Intuition? 
Presumably most of us already accept that there are some epistemic states or 
doxastic attitudes that bear instrumental value.21 Why should we go further? That is, why 
should we accept that which the Guiding Intuition presupposes--that there is some value in 
the epistemic domain that is important and distinctive from the instrumental value that is 
typical of (or at least possibly borne by) many different kinds of doxastic attitudes?22 One 
response, offered by Ernest Sosa and endorsed by Kurt Sylvan,23 requires the adoption of 
what Sosa calls “the epistemic point of view”. The epistemic point of view is a perspective 
on evaluative questions that treats the epistemic domain as a sphere of evaluative inquiry 
unto itself, and leaves aside the question of whether or not those success and failure 
conditions ought to be taken to be weighty, in the normative or evaluative sense, in a 
domain-independent way.  
We are already intimately familiar with the epistemic point of view. It is this 
perspective we adopt when we negatively evaluate strategies like random guesswork and 
lazy adherence to authority, as well as states like simultaneously holding badly incoherent 
beliefs. Likewise for our positive evaluations of knowledge, wisdom, rationality, the ability 
                                                
21 I don’t see why one would deny this so long as they accept that there are a reasonable number of agents 
in pursuit of practical ends which are at least morally, practically, or otherwise normatively permitted 
(perhaps by relevantly “weighty” norms). Focusing just on the moral case for simplicity, if moral nihilism 
or some very revisionary moral realist view is correct and no or very few agents’ practical projects ought to 
be thought of as morally permissible, then it could be argued that there is no (or not) enough instrumental 
value in the epistemic domain because there (either actually or simply in practise) is no relevant final value 
that epistemic states or doxastic attitudes conduce towards. Adherents of such skeptical and revisionist 
views may be best served by taking what follows to be hypothetical in nature, as an investigation of the 
non-skeptical, non-revisionist picture.  
22 For more on the breadth of instrumental value in the epistemic domain, see chapter two.  
23 See Sylvan (2018). 
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to offer satisfying explanations, and the development of one’s understanding. It is worth 
noting that the commonsense picture of this domain includes multiple positively evaluable 
epistemic states, though their relative fundamentality is open to argument. 
While some philosophers may find the evaluations made from the epistemic point 
of view worthy of domain-independent acceptance in their final value theory, my suspicion 
is that others will either lack the sense that there is intrinsic epistemic value or, recognizing 
it, seek to explain this impression away, for example by reduction to another kind of value 
(perhaps practical value) or by offering an error theory. And it is worth noting that the 
adoption of the epistemic point of view is less a response to this ontological anxiety and 
more of a concession to it. My goal is not to overcome the skeptical or reductionist view 
directly in this piece but instead to offer an alternative picture with enough virtues to merit 
our attention.  
Still, we should ask what the alternative reductionist or skeptical view about the 
intrinsic value of the epistemic domain might look like, for illustrative purposes. One 
simple and forceful version of this sort of attitude about the epistemic domain could be 
called an Instrumentalist attitude. An Instrumentalist would be willing to grant that there 
is epistemic value, but would hold that this value is wholly extrinsic--specifically, 
instrumental. It is easy to imagine an advocate of this picture: one need only imagine a 
deflationary Veritist.24 Veritists accept that the fundamental epistemic aim is truth (often 
with some qualification, for example, truths about certain topics or truths relevant to certain 
agential aims). The Instrumentalist, as a deflationary Veritist, is in a position to explain 
their adherence to the view that the truth is of fundamental epistemic value by appeal to 
the instrumental, practical value of veridical epistemic states and doxastic attitudes. A 
                                                
24 For more discussion of Veritism see Berker (2013); cf. Goldman (2015).  
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careful Instrumentalist need not endorse the claim that veridical states are categorically 
valuable, and can instead emphasize the role that many or most veridical states have as 
sufficient for successfully getting about in the world--achieving our practical ends, and so 
on.  
This seems to me a very sensible picture. But when this kind of instrumental value 
is taken to be an exhaustive account of epistemic value, it is difficult for me to avoid the 
impression that we are leaving out some important complications in order to preserve the 
simplicity of our view. There seems to me a clear and familiar sense in which certain agents 
can excel in a way that seems valuable without regard to downstream consequences, and 
that this sense is best captured by a non-deflationary view of epistemic value. This seems 
particularly salient if we imagine a pair of agents who end up equally well off in terms of 
the practical goods the Instrumentalist takes the epistemic goods to conduce towards, but 
who arrive at that position of parity through doxastic states that are different in ways that 
seem intuitively to matter epistemically--for example, if one of the two believes luckily.   
These sorts of situations seem to me utterly mundane and familiar, the stuff of our 
everyday lives. We could try to capture the asymmetries in the different cases in terms of 
knowledge, or belief formation faculties or processes, mental capacities, skills, know-how, 
or via some other tool of philosophical analysis. Focusing on such cases inclines me 
towards the idea that enthusiasm for the hard-nosed Instrumentalist picture of epistemic 
value may be the result of some philosophers’ lengthy focus on theoretically laden accounts 
of knowledge, and the (admittedly abundant) instrumental value of believing the truth.25 I 
hope attending to familiar, mundane cases at least suggests that an alternative picture is 
                                                
25 For most of us, most of the time, given most aims. See section 2.2. 
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worth considering. I suspect that if such cases do not fill this motivational role, nothing 
else will.  
This diagnosis, though I hope plausible, is of course not an argument that there is 
non-extrinsic epistemic value. Naturally, the subsequent work will appear better motivated 
to the extent that the intuition that there is such epistemic value seems forceful, and not 
easily explained away. Here is a schematic version of such an argument directed against 
an Instrumentalist. Returning to considerations introduced above, if we can specify two 
agents who are identically well-off in terms of the practical goods to which the relevant 
epistemic states conduce, but who nevertheless are not equally well-off in epistemic terms, 
then we can infer that there is some difference in value between the two agents which must 
be the result of epistemic value not captured by Instrumentalism.26  
I take it that such a case would be valuable for two reasons. First, it would not 
require that we identify some particular epistemic state or doxastic attitude as the state or 
attitude that is the epistemic difference-maker. This is an advantage since it allows us 
flexibility that the straightforward assertion of the value of e.g., knowledge, lacks. Of 
course, if we conclude that knowledge is the state that makes the epistemic difference, this 
will be compatible with how we have set things up. But it is to our advantage not to build 
the case against Instrumentalism in a way that presupposes that this one epistemic state is 
the bearer of distinctive epistemic value. The second reason to prefer the current approach 
to the stipulative one is because unlike the straightforward assertion of epistemic value, the 
presentation of an example, even a simple one, will leave us with a better sense of what it 
is to excel epistemically by providing a picture (albeit a limited one) of that kind of success. 
                                                
26 I am restricting the scope of this example argument to the non-instrumental rather than the entirety of the 
non-extrinsic in order to preserve simplicity. Considerations of more recherche varieties of extrinsic value, 
like indicator value, would require corresponding complications in the argument that, given the merely 
illustrative nature of this example argument, do not seem worth indulging in. 
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I do not mean to suggest that all epistemic success or value must be a close analogue of the 
kind given by the example I intend to discuss. The discussion focuses on an illustrative 
example, not a paradigmatic case to which all other cases of epistemic value are assumed 
to bear deep resemblance. This is important because it leaves the door open to views like 
those defended by certain Epistemic Virtue Theorists, who hold that there are distinct kinds 
of epistemic excellence (knowledge, wisdom, understanding, etc.).27 
One last proviso. In the sample case to follow, it is important to note that the 
epistemic states of the two agents themselves do not have to be identical, or even similar; 
we are challenging the idea that all value in the epistemic domain is extrinsic, specifically 
instrumental. (In this case, let us suppose for the sake of argument that this end is something 
like a rational agent’s achieving some, perhaps constrained, practical goal or goals.) If the 
ends are equally well realized in two agents but there is nevertheless an evaluative 
difference between those two agents that seems best cashed out in epistemic terms, then 
we have good reason to take it that there is indeed non-instrumental epistemic value. I will 
now attempt to furnish such a case.  
Imagine a near duplicate of a master carpenter. Suppose that this near duplicate 
behaves indistinguishably from the actual master carpenter during some (perhaps lengthy) 
episode of woodworking. The duplicate is different only because the duplicate’s behavior 
is the result of a silicon chip implanted into their brain which forces them to, e.g., respond 
to such-and-such a question about woodworking or such-and-such a piece of knotty wood 
in just the same sort of way the actual master carpenter would. While the actual master 
carpenter’s dispositions are grounded in a lifetime of practice and learning, the 
doppelganger’s dispositions are the result of fantastical sci-fi interference.   
                                                
27 See e.g. Zagzebski (2001). 
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If the sci-fi chip-implanted-duplicate story seems offensively far-fetched, we can 
make our point sufficiently well with an amateur craftsperson blessed with exceptional 
luck. Though this amateur does not know (or even truly believe) the same sorts of 
propositions about woodworking that the actual master carpenter does, and is in fact guided 
in their enterprises by false belief and guesswork, fate conspires to make the amateur’s 
misguided attempts succeed in a way indistinguishable from the successes enjoyed by the 
actual master carpenter. When the actual master carpenter holds the chisel just so and, in 
light of their beliefs and dispositions based on experience with this kind of wood in similar 
conditions, hammers just hard enough to cut a mortise of the appropriate depth, the lucky 
amateur fumbles their way to an indistinguishable result, over and over again. When asked 
questions by apprentices the lucky amatuer happens to guess--again, through sheer luck--
the very responses the actual master carpenter would give (despite the lucky amateur’s 
relevant false beliefs).28 And so on. 
It seems clear to me that neither luck nor the machinations of mad scientists make 
up the entirety of the epistemic gap between the doppelganger and amateur on the one hand 
and the genuine master carpenter on the other. Although the lucky performance of the 
amateur and the beliefs or belief-analogues of the doppelganger may suffice for all the 
practical goods that might follow from the master carpenter’s epistemic states, there is a 
clear sense in which the actual master craftsperson is better off than either the doppelganger 
or the amateur, and whether one prefers to explain that difference in terms of knowledge, 
know-how, or some other state, at least part of the difference is epistemic. I conclude that 
                                                
28 Those inclined towards certain dispositional accounts of belief may find it difficult to accept that an 
agent who so systematically acts against their belief in fact does hold the relevant belief. For relevant, 
although perhaps indirect engagement with this view, see section 2.3. 
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the actual master carpenter has more of the epistemic goods, and so I conclude that there 
are more epistemic goods to be had than merely instrumental ones.  
Of course, the committed instrumentalist about epistemic value may deny this. 
They may suggest for example that this conclusion is a mistake due to our familiarity with 
the actual world, free of sneakily implanted carpentry chips and improbably lucky amateur 
woodworkers, and that if we were used to a world with such events, or if we simply took 
seriously the success rate of the silicon chip or the reliability of the amateur’s luck, our 
seeming that the master carpenter is better off would evaporate. Perhaps it would. Like 
most arguments, this one admits of response. But in this case I do not find the response 
more compelling than the argument. And we have at least shown that there is a perspective 
ready to hand from which we can assess epistemic value non-instrumentally.  
It might also be pointed out that our assumptions about the instrumental goods 
towards which epistemic states conduce were extremely sparse. It is easy to imagine this 
as the thin end of a dialectical wedge: the objector then goes on to suggest that if the breadth 
and diversity of the many personal and interpersonal outcomes of our epistemic states were 
adequately appreciated, the examples would fall apart. The bedrock response is that the 
Instrumentalist picture is objectionable because it is trying to assess epistemic states on the 
basis of their outcomes when it is clear that the connection between what goes on in the 
head and what happens subsequently outside of it are connected in many complex ways 
subject to many kinds of interference. The hard-nosed Instrumentalist accepts this and 
draws the conclusion that there are many ways to succeed epistemically: any way that 
results in practical success. The non-Instrumentalist will likely see this as a reductio, closer 
to an abandonment of the attempt to discover epistemic value than success in that endeavor.  
It suffices for my purposes that we seem to have ready access to a point of view 
from which the actual master carpenter is epistemically better off than either pretender, and 
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that taking up that point of view does not seem woefully naive or metaphysically 
extravagant enough to merit dismissal out of hand.  
1.3 Pritchard’s Three Value Problems 
Duncan Pritchard (2007) helpfully frames the existing literature about epistemic 
value by distinguishing several related issues that have been taken up by different writers. 
He calls these the Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Value Problems. It’s worth noting that 
unlike the Guiding Intuition, Pritchard’s division of value problems is primarily meant as 
a guide to the issues that are taken up in the literature rather than primarily as a suggestion 
for how we ought to proceed.  That said, I list them below.  
 
Primary Value Problem: Why is knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief? 
 
Secondary Value Problem: Why is knowledge more valuable than any [proper] subset of 
its parts?29 
 
Tertiary Value Problem: Why is knowledge more valuable than “…that which falls short 
of knowledge not merely as a matter of degree but of kind”? 
 
Before discussing these briefly in turn it is worth noting the extent to which the 
existing literature, by generally focusing on versions of these issues, has focused on the 
relationship between knowledge and states such as true belief as opposed to the evaluative 
shape of the epistemic domain overall (perhaps better achieved by comparing knowledge 
                                                
29 “Proper” is my addition. Pritchard’s use of “subset” invites a distracting objection to do with the nature 
of the subset relation that disappears once we add that he clearly has in mind proper subsets. 
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to states like know-how, wisdom, understanding, or features like epistemic virtues) and has 
taken for granted that knowledge has some special value when compared to e.g. mere true 
belief.  
The Primary Value Problem, also sometimes referred to as the Meno Problem 
because of a tendency to identify the challenge in Plato’s Meno30 with the Primary Value 
Problem, is the question that many recent inquiries seem to haven taken as their basic 
motivating question. If one sees themselves as investigating the Primary Value Problem, 
their goal is similar to vindicating the Guiding Intuition. While Pritchard’s formulation 
directs our attention narrowly to a comparison with true belief, vindicating the Guiding 
Intuition would require us to say something about knowledge that would distinguish it from 
all other doxastic propositional attitudes. One distinction between the Guiding Intuition 
and the Primary Value Problem worth noting is that the ‘thinner’ one’s preferred account 
of knowledge is--that is, the less one’s preferred account of knowledge adds over and above 
true belief--the more perspicuous the Primary Value Problem becomes. Pritchard’s narrow, 
contrastive focus on true belief seems to stack the deck against theories of knowledge that 
are in this sense thin.31 
The Secondary Value Problem is usually brought up in the context of Gettier 
conditions on analyses of knowledge. Although the language here might seem to suggest a 
potentially dubious relationship of constitution, by “parts” Pritchard seems to mean only 
                                                
30 For	more	discussion	of	the	challenge	raised	in	the	Meno	see	footnotes	45	and	53,	but	for	now	it	is	
worth	noting	that	the	response	Socrates	offers	(“episteme”	is	right	opinion	plus	a	“logismos	aitias”)	
should	strike	many	contemporary	epistemologists,	particularly	those	attracted	by	some	form	of	
Externalism,	as	very	demanding	if	we	accept	that	“episteme”	ought	to	be	translated	as	‘knowledge’.	For	
discussion	of	this	see	Schwab	(2015)	and	(2016).	For	more	see	Smith	(1998)	and	Woodruff	in	
Epistemology:	Companions	to	Ancient	Thought	1,		Ed.	Everson	(1990).	 
31 This is worth noting especially given the defense by Goldman and others of knowledge ascriptions as 
genuine states of knowing where the truth conditions for those knowledge ascriptions are merely that the 
agent to whom knowledge is ascribed truly believe the proposition in question, see Goldman and Olsson on 
“weak knowledge”, (2009). Compare Jager (2014).  
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the various conditions knowledge must meet: that the proposition is believed, true, 
justified, satisfies some sort of anti-Gettier clause, and so on, according to one’s preferred 
theory. Attention to this Secondary problem licenses questions of the following kind: if it 
is necessary for knowledge that it was reached safely, what role should the safety of belief 
formation play with regard to the value of the resulting piece of knowledge? Olsson and his 
interlocutors agree, as we shall see, that at least for Reliabilism, the Gettier condition ought 
not to be the condition that lends epistemic value. Riggs, on the other hand, seems to 
suggest that considering the role of the Gettier condition might be somewhere where we 
could make substantial progress.32 Pritchard’s taxonomy allows us to cast this as a 
Secondary Value Problem dispute. 
The Tertiary Value Problem represents a constraint on responses to the Primary 
Value Problem in that, if we take the Tertiary Value Problem to be well-motivated, we are 
thereby agreeing that only accounts of the value of knowledge that respond to the Primary 
Value Problem by showing knowledge to be more valuable as a matter of kind rather than 
of degree are acceptable. The relationship between the Tertiary Value Problem and the 
Guiding Intuition is intimate. 
Theories that conceive of knowledge as true belief that rises to some justificatory 
threshold might seem to be in a difficult position with regard to the Tertiary Value Problem, 
since the move from mere justified true belief to knowledge on such accounts is just an 
accumulation of degrees of justification and not obviously a deep or explanatorily 
promising difference in kind.33 One immediately available though perhaps unsatisfying 
response is to hold that knowledge is different in kind just by being true belief justified to 
                                                
32 But see also Gardiner (2017). 
33 Someone who accepted a Williamsonian “knowledge-first” framework might be particularly well 
positioned to respond to the tertiary value problem, given the theoretical materials available to them: such 
views do make, indeed rely upon, there being an important difference in kind between knowledge and non-
knowledge states.  
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the degree that meets the threshold for knowledge.34 On this approach, meeting the 
justificationary threshold is not merely a change in degree of justification (or for example 
reliability of belief formation process type) but a change in degree of justification that 
transforms or promotes mere true belief into knowledge. This slippery thought might be 
extended as either a response to or rejection of the Tertiary Value Problem: the former by 
holding that this promotion lends or creates a distinctive kind of value, and the latter by 
holding that the availability of this response for accounts of knowledge that only issue in 
true belief plus changes in degree of justification undercuts any intuitive appeal the Tertiary 
Value Problem might have.  
Importantly, Pritchard conceives of our task in responding to these challenges as 
admitting of some degree of what he calls “revisionism”.35 Although he and others take 
each of these challenges to be well-motivated, it may turn out that an independently well-
motivated theory of knowledge will fail to deliver a satisfying response to one of these 
challenges. In that situation we would have to weigh the other benefits of the theory against 
the motivations for accepting the value problem(s) to which it fails to respond. If we 
decided to accept a theory that failed to respond satisfyingly to one of the three value 
problems Pritchard poses, we would be being Revisionary in that we would be denying the 
importance of a challenge that carried intuitive weight.36 
                                                
34 Proponents of this hypothetical line might be failing to take seriously the so-called Threshold Problem 
for knowledge (See e.g. Hannon 2017), but if one had a non-arbitrary reason for placing the threshold for 
knowledge at some level they would thereby be well-position to reply to the objection that the transition 
from mere true, justified belief to knowledge was a mere difference of degree rather than a different in 
kind. 
35 Pritchard (2007). 
36 The Rawlsian notion of Reflective Equilibrium (RE) is helpful in grasping Pritchard’s notion of 
Revisionism. In RE we begin with some intuitions and other inputs, and consider whether conflicts emerge 
between them. We may, as a result of RE, abandon some intuitions that originally seemed forceful. Just so 
for Pritchard with respect to the various value problems. 
 24 
1.4 A Dispute Between Frameworks 
While Pritchard’s taxonomy is helpful in coming to grips with the way many 
thinkers have oriented their inquiries into epistemic value, I prefer to focus on the Guiding 
Intuition. There are two reasons for this. One is that if we conceive of ourselves as 
investigating the three value problems directly and eventually conclude that we must be 
revisionary with regard to some of them, we will only have discovered that we set up faulty 
requirements on acceptable theories of knowledge. If we start with the Guiding Intuition, 
our task is instead to see to what extent we can vindicate an intuition with a lengthy 
philosophical pedigree and, more importantly, a great deal of intuitive attractiveness 
according to many contemporary epistemologists.37 It is one thing to be revisionary about, 
for example, the Secondary Value Problem. It seems to me quite another to deny the 
Guiding Intuition. Revisionism about the former would just be learning that a question that 
appeared deep is actually shallow. (Perhaps composition is the wrong way to think about 
the relations between the features of an agent who knows some proposition, for example.) 
Revisionism about the latter would be a very surprising result; it would mean that our 
fundamental picture of the epistemic domain was badly formed in a surprising way.  
A second reason to prefer framing our task in terms of the Guiding Intuition has to 
do with contemporary research into doxastic attitudes and epistemic states other than 
knowledge—for example, Understanding. Framing our inquiry into epistemic value as an 
inquiry into the value of knowledge, as much of the existing discussion already has, rules 
out from the outset the possibility of giving sustained attention to other doxastic attitudes. 
If it turns out that argument compels us to be revisionary about the Guiding Intuition, we 
would retain the option to move our attempt to locate epistemic value to some other 
doxastic state, rather than to conclude that there is no doxastic attitude of distinctive 
                                                
37 Grimm, Williamson, Kvanvig, Riggs, Goldman, etc. 
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epistemic value, just because the best going theory of knowledge fails to respond 
adequately to Pritchard’s tripartite value problem. I think we naturally engage with 
knowledge because it seems the most promising way to vindicate a Weak Guiding 
Intuition:  
 
Weak Guiding Intuition: There is some doxastic attitude that bears distinctive epistemic 
value.38  
 
I see the Guiding Intuition, as well as the literature surveyed by Pritchard about the 
value of knowledge, as an endorsement of the idea that we ought to begin our search for 
the doxastic attitude that bears distinctive epistemic value with knowledge.39 Kvanvig, after 
concluding that there are serious difficulties in living up to his own account of the value of 
knowledge, suggests eventually that we might turn to understanding. I would characterize 
this maneuver as a retreat from consideration of knowledge as the best available way to 
satisfy the Weak Guiding Intuition. I take it that this characterization is informative, and I 
see the availability of offering this characterization as a reason to prefer conceiving of our 
task in terms of the Guiding Intuition. 
The dialectical terrain is rocky here. There are surely some epistemologists who 
will either fail to see the appeal of the Guiding Intuition or, seeing some appeal, would not 
                                                
38 Although I am open to the possibility that a full inventory of properly epistemic value might well contain 
agential features or dispositions (such as open-mindedness) I’m going to restrict my attention to doxastic 
attitudes and epistemic states since I take it there is interesting work to be done here, and leave open 
questions about the kinds of agential features that are of interest to e.g. virtue epistemologists.  
39 This might strike some readers as exactly backwards. Such a reader might think we are only attempting 
to give a precise analysis of knowledge because it is antecedently clear that knowledge is valuable. 
Whether or not this somewhat Platonic idea captures the motivations of many contemporary 
epistemologists is unclear to me, but the more direct response to this approach is that it has proved 
fiendishly difficult to make the analyses of knowledge we have on offer live up to the Guiding Intuition. 
For my own part it seems clearer to me that there are valuable doxastic states than it is that those states are 
captured uniformly by any of there going analyses of knowledge. 
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be willing to abandon an otherwise well-supported theory of knowledge were it to fail to 
vindicate the Guiding Intuition. From such a point of view, any inquiry into epistemic value 
would likely seem otiose. There are likewise epistemologists so in the grip of the Guiding 
Intuition that they seem ready to dismiss any proposed theory of knowledge, no matter how 
well that theory fares with regard to other desiderata, if that theory fails to adequately 
capture their preferred view of epistemic value.40 No doubt some such individuals will 
reject my proposing the Weak Guiding Intuition as a useful explanation of the central status 
of the Guiding Intuition.  
I suspect it will be tempting for some to resist the replacement of the Guiding 
Intuition with the Weak Guiding Intuition by insisting that they are interested in (or 
disinterested in) the value of knowledge, not the value some other poorly understood 
epistemic state might bear. This is an important point. Such a complainant could point to 
Pritchard’s Primary Value problem as evidence that other epistemologists are focused on 
the narrower task meant to be captured by the Guiding Intuition, and do not see themselves 
as engaging with the Weak Guiding Intuition in any direct way. I would like to agree that 
most discussion of epistemic value so far has focused on knowledge. I do not take either 
the Guiding Intuition or the Weak Guiding Intuition to be theses overtly considered and 
endorsed.  
Here is the explanation I prefer for the evident preference in the literature for 
investigating the value of knowledge rather than a more general search for epistemic value. 
Recent epistemology was preoccupied for a lengthy period of time with an attempt to give 
a definition of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, almost to the 
                                                
40 Zagzebski	seems	to	be	an	example	of	someone	sympathetic	to	the	latter	viewpoint,	when	she	proposes	
in	Recovering	Understanding	(2001)	that	20th	century	epistemology	has	gotten	off-track	in	pursuing	
knowledge	to	the	exclusion	of	wisdom	and	understanding.	 
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exclusion of sustained investigation into other epistemic states. There are several important 
exceptions: Ramsey and others were interested in prediction, decision theory, and the 
scientific attitude of acceptance (as distinct from belief) in the early 20th century, and there 
has been some discussion of practical knowledge or “knowledge-how” on and off for 
several decades, but it is clear that the central topic within epistemology for a long period 
was the search for an analysis of knowledge.  
When some contemporary epistemologists turned their attention to questions of 
value, it was within the context of this larger disciplinary dispute over the nature of 
knowledge. (After all, the Swamping problem was originally introduced as an objection to 
Reliabilism.) Although admittedly a piece of sociological speculation, it seems reasonable 
to infer that the preference for talk about the value of knowledge to epistemic value in 
general is the result of a preoccupation with knowledge within 20th century 
epistemology.41  
Given recent work by Kvanvig and others to bring our attention to non-knowledge 
and yet distinctly epistemic phenomena, it seems to me methodologically preferable to 
acknowledge the Weak Guiding Intuition as the proper starting point, and, if one takes it 
that the proper object of investigation is knowledge, to offer arguments in favor of this 
position. If we end up accepting the view that the value of knowledge is to be the central 
question here, we ought to accept that view as the result of argument rather than 
assumption. It would be an embarrassing situation if our insistence on the primacy of 
knowledge was the result of a passing philosophical fashion, even a slowly passing one.42 
                                                
41 For further discussion of related ideas, see Zagzebski (2001)  for an argument that modern epistemology 
as a whole represents a move away from philosophical interest in wisdom and understanding and towards 
knowledge and truth. BonJour’s The Myth of Knowledge (2010) and Kaplan’s It’s Not What You Know 
That Counts (1985) are examples of more extreme arguments against the increasing complexity and 
artificiality of philosophical analyses of knowledge. See also Horvath (2016) and DePaul (2009).   
42 The Primary Value Problem, or Meno Problem, is an interesting case study here. Although the Meno 
focuses on the value of “episteme”, the correct translation of that term is hotly debated among scholars of 
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Chapter 2: Truth, Belief, Knowledge, and Value 
2.1 A Disclaimer About the Inquiry into “Mere True Belief” 
There is a growing movement, pushed forward by Williamson and others, to build 
our epistemological theory not on the back of the notion of belief but instead with the 
notion of knowledge. On this “knowledge-first” view, knowledge is taken to be the “default 
factive attitude”43 an agent takes towards a proposition. According to these theorists, 
knowledge is something in the light of which we ought to clarify other epistemic notions, 
as opposed to something best analyzed in terms of other, more fundamental notions (such 
as belief). On standard versions of this view, while it is true of agents who know that P that 
they also believe that P, their state of knowing that P is not constituted by a more 
fundamental44 belief state which satisfies some other criteria, as on the traditional story.  
Adopting the knowledge-first approach can make instances of mere true belief 
appear somewhat odd. Since the knowledge first theory fits naturally with (perhaps better: 
is frequently motivated by) the anti-skeptical thought that we generally get things right, 
and that generally those instances of getting things right count as knowledge, one might 
wonder what a mere true belief would be. Given a certain familiarity with or reliance upon 
an older paradigm, which we can call the belief-first framework (according to which 
epistemic theorizing uses belief in the role the knowledge-first framework reserves for 
knowledge) this thought can be difficult to appreciate. It seems natural to think that, given 
                                                
ancient philosophy. While “knowledge” has been the traditional translation, several scholars are arguing for 
“understanding” as a better translation. See Schwab (2015). This is a minor dialectical point, but it would 
seem to take some of the wind out of the sails of the view that we ought to restrict our investigation to 
knowledge. 
43 For the canonical presentation of the position, see Williamson (2000). 
44 There is an important question about the contrast between explanatory and ontological nature of belief 
on the Williamsonian view. Although it is clear that the knowledge-first project is committed to at least an 
explanatory preference for knowledge, it seems natural to imagine this explanatory preference is explained 
by an ontological distinction. My discussion here presupposes this, but I don’t think anything vital hangs on 
interpreting Williamson this way at this point. 
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the belief-first view, even if the agent’s knowing that P and believing that P are instantiated 
simultaneously, their knowledge just is a belief state that satisfies some other criteria. This 
makes the place of mere true belief easy to recognize: on the belief-first view, mere true 
beliefs are simply cases where the belief that P fails to meet whatever other criteria are 
required for a true belief to count as knowledge.  
The knowledge-first theorist’s task can seem more difficult by comparison. Since 
knowledge is the default attitude we take towards facts, it might seem that the knowledge-
first theorist will have difficulties explaining how agents end up with mere true beliefs. 
Two points about this. First, this appearance likely stems from an unduly weighty reading 
of “default”. Rather than understanding this piece of language as something like a disguised 
universal claim, I take it that if we understand it as a preponderance claim the difficulty 
vanishes, or at least is reduced to the difficulty of defending the idea that we often know 
and relatively rarely merely truly believe, a thought the knowledge-first theorist (and 
indeed any anti-skeptical epistemologist, whether knowledge-first or not) is likely to wish 
to vindicate eventually. 
The second point is this: it’s not that the knowledge-first theorist’s theoretical 
framework requires her to say that mere true belief is any more or less common than the 
belief-first theorist’s framework. But what it does illuminate is that the knowledge-first 
theorist’s picture fits more naturally with a conception of mere true belief on which such 
states are degenerate pieces of knowledge. The knowledge first theory seems to suggest 
that, in general, agents end up with mere true beliefs as a result of failed attempts to know. 
In other words, in order to end up merely truly believing, something has (at least usually) 
gone wrong: either the evidence is worse than one took it to be, one is treating their 
evidence irresponsibly, some strange set of unlucky (or lucky!) circumstances obtains, or 
some other epistemic problem or defect is present. For my own part, I think the knowledge-
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first characterization of mere true belief is more attractive than the characterization typical 
of the belief-first view. When I try to imagine cases of mere true belief, instances of agents 
who truly believe that P but are such that it seems inappropriate to attribute knowledge of 
P to them, they often have an unusual or defective character just as the knowledge-first 
approach seems to predict they will.45 Many of the most natural cases of this type are 
charlatans or epistemic ne’er-do-wells of one stripe or another: lucky guessers, improbable 
tarot card readers, fallacy-inclined gamblers, and so on.  
We should take seriously the assumptions built into the framework we use to 
discuss mere true belief when inquiring into the value of that state, especially if we take 
seriously the idea that the value of a state or object is not simply an additive result of the 
values of the parts or components of that object. If a mere true belief is, as a belief-first 
theorist might say, not best thought of as flawed in some important sense but instead merely 
as a believing that has not achieved the lofty status of knowledge, this may well have an 
impact on our thinking about the value of mere true belief when compared to an alternate 
picture on which, as the knowledge first framework seems to suggest, mere true belief is 
(at least generally) the result of something’s having gone wrong somewhere along the line 
in an attempt to know something. Most importantly for our purposes, on a view like the 
knowledge-first view, it becomes more natural to regard mere true belief as generally less 
valuable (in the many cases where it is the product of a flawed process) than we would 
likely be inclined to take it to be on the traditional belief-first view.46 
                                                
45 With the possible exception of cases of putative mere true-belief introduced as part of a theoretically 
laden discussion of certain contextualist views, motivated by investigations of “high-stakes” epistemic 
scenarios often taken to motivate Contextualist views of knowledge. 
46 Spelling out the sense in which such lucky or misguided mere true beliefs will lack value compared to 
other possibly benign mere true beliefs will be difficult, for reasons that will become apparent in section 
2.2. Despite the ability of the lucky guesser’s guess to, e.g., guide them successfully to Larissa, it seems 
clear that “from the epistemic point of view” something has gone very badly wrong in such cases. 
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For this reason, it seems possible to me that the ascendency of the knowledge-first 
approach could signal a sea change in the way we think about the value of mere true belief. 
This is especially important given the dialectical role of analyses of the value of that state. 
Much existing work comes to conclusions about the value of knowledge by contrasting it 
with the value of true belief. Recall, for example, Pritchard’s approach to epistemic value-
-specifically his Primary Value Problem. The Primary Value Problem explicitly directs us 
to compare the value of knowledge to the value of mere true belief. We need to be careful 
in assessing our background assumptions about true belief before making this comparison.  
If the belief-first theoretical framework is apt to mislead us about the value of mere 
true belief, we have some reason to be skeptical of theories of the value of knowledge that 
rely on the belief-first framework and are argued even partially on contrastive grounds. It 
seems possible to me that much older work will need to be reconsidered in the light of this 
and other insights afforded by the knowledge-first framework. Having flagged this 
possibility, in subsequent sections, especially in chapter three, I wish to assume the 
orthodox, belief-first picture in order to more naturally engage Goldman and Olsson.  
2.2 Knowledge and Instrumental Value 
As I’ve stated it, the Guiding Intuition is very weak, and deliberately so. It demands 
only that knowledge be shown to have value that stands out when compared to the value 
borne by other doxastic attitudes. This is because I take it that many doxastic attitudes will 
bear one kind of value at least some of the time: instrumental value. Plausible accounts of 
knowledge should yield the result that agents who know that P are well-positioned to 
achieve related practical ends. If a proposition, T, states the location of the nearest train 
station, then in most cases (given moderately cooperative circumstances) agents who know 
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T and aim to arrive at that train station are well-positioned to do so. If they succeed by 
making use of their knowledge, it will have been of instrumental value to them.  
It is tempting to conclude that this instrumental value is typical of knowledge, and 
then to ask whether this kind of value could be the value noted in the Guiding Intuition.47 
There are two responses worth offering here. The first is typically taken to motivate the 
Primary Value Problem: this instrumental value, insofar as it seems to generally flow from 
the truth of the thing known, seems to be achievable without satisfying the further 
conditions on true belief48 that would promote it to knowledge. As in the Meno, it seems 
that knowledge’s instrumental value does not distinguish it from mere true belief.  
To clarify, if Jane is trying to get to the nearest train station and merely truly 
believes that T, but succeeds by acting in accord with this true belief, it seems this true 
belief has been just as instrumentally valuable as the corresponding piece of knowledge 
would have been. Jane would be like Socrates’ man on the road to Larissa.49 And this would 
make it the case that we had failed to vindicate the Guiding Intuition by showing that 
knowledge has instrumental value, because this instrumental value would not be distinctive 
of knowledge, since it is shared by mere true belief. The Guiding Intuition is not merely 
that knowledge is valuable, but that it at least tends to have some kind of distinctive value 
that makes it stand out when compared to other doxastic states.  
                                                
47 Again, living up to the Guiding Intuition does not require showing that knowledge is categorically 
valuable.  
48 Williamsonians may prefer to avoid talk of “adding” conditions to true belief in order to achieve 
knowledge, given that on their view it is knowledge itself that is the “default” doxastic factive attitude, but 
on their view there is still an important difference between knowing and merely believing, so I take it the 
point is merely linguistic.  
49 Kaplan (1985) and Zagzebski (1996) mention that the Socratic project preserved in Plato, as related to 
“episteme”, might not be best thought of by analogy to knowledge but instead to something like 
understanding. What to make of this suggestion given the unclarity involved in the latter notion isn’t 
obvious, but given that this exegetical claim about the Meno is usually serving in a motivational role for a 
question of obvious independent interest, I will leave the exegetical issue aside for now. See Schwab 
(2015) for more discussion.  
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The second point regarding the instrumental value of knowledge has to do with the 
instrumental value, not of mere true belief, but of some false beliefs. As noted above, 
knowledge generally has instrumental value, but not in all cases. Sometimes knowledge is 
a hindrance. There are many pairs of agents and practical aims such that, for some 
proposition Q, an agent is more likely to succeed given that they falsely believe ~Q rather 
than truly believing (or knowing) Q.50 An example may help make the structure of a class 
of these cases clear. 
Suppose Tom wishes to make the U.S. Olympic swimming team. Suppose also that 
given Tom’s times in his chosen events, it is unlikely that he will make the team. Call this 
true proposition, that Tom is unlikely to make the team, Q. A final stipulation: if Tom 
believes (or knows) Q, he will lose motivation to train, making it even less likely that he 
will go on to represent the U.S. in the Olympics. Plausibly, if Tom were to believe ~Q, this 
would not only avoid the deleterious effects on Tom’s efforts to realize his goal and to join 
the Olympic team that would accrue were he to believe (or know) Q, but could actually 
help motivate Tom to continue training. Tom could falsely think to himself: I am well-
positioned to succeed, so long as I continue training. Given this picture of the motivational 
upshot of belief in ~Q, it seems that Tom’s false belief might well be of great instrumental 
value, given his goal.  
The general outline of these cases of instrumentally valuable false belief are clear 
enough: an agent is situated with regard to some practical aim such that for some relevant 
proposition they are more likely to succeed given a false belief than a true one. Some might 
object that mere likelihood of success does not suffice for these beliefs to produce real 
instrumental value. The details of instrumental value generation are not perfectly clear but 
                                                
50 And, perhaps importantly, we are loath to attribute some sort of defect to the agents involved. The 
features of their psychological makeup that enable false beliefs to play the right kind of role seem utterly 
common and benign.  
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this objection seems fair enough. Happily we do not need to take a strong position on the 
nature of instrumental value to respond satisfyingly. Against this objection we need only 
slightly modify the case such that the agent does succeed in their aim given their false 
belief, and that had they believed the relevant true proposition, they would have failed. 
Though perhaps less frequent, cases with this structure do not seem objectionably unusual 
or uncommon. So long as there are any cases with this character, we may conclude that 
instrumental value is not unique to knowledge nor to mere true belief, but instead that even 
false beliefs can be of instrumental value. 
One way to think about what has gone awry in these cases is to think about one 
schematic (broadly Humean) view about practical reasoning, according to which practical 
reasoning requires an affective or conative component, as well as a doxastic component. I 
effect, proponents of such views take intentional action to require both a representation or 
picture of the world and a related goal or aim--a map and a compass, if you like. Though 
knowledge is one doxastic attitude on which one could act,51 one could also act and succeed 
on the basis of a mere belief, or perhaps even some other doxastic attitude, like a suspicion 
or prediction. Though others have discussed cases where instrumental value results from 
true and even false beliefs as well as knowledge, I haven’t yet seen the point made that this 
is to be expected given that at least on a broadly Humean view of practical reasoning, it is 
possible to act on the basis of any of a multitude of different doxastic inputs--neither 
knowledge nor mere true belief is uniquely suited to the role of doxastic input into the 
practical syllogism.52 Section 2.3 will briefly expand on this issue.  
                                                
51 Perhaps even the norm of action, as discussed in Williamson (2000) and the subsequent literature.  
52 Although the Humean theories of motivation and action are often challenged, it is typical of these 
challenges that it is the conative or affective state that is regarded as superfluous. Most challengers seem 
ready to grant that there is a doxastic component to intentional action, so my point here should not fall prey 
to this familiar criticism of the broadly Humean story of motivation and action, see e.g. Dancy (2000).  
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Whether or not this appeal to practical reasoning to explain the potential 
instrumental value of different doxastic attitudes is illuminating, not only is instrumental 
value not distinctive of knowledge (as shown by Jane), it is not even guaranteed by 
knowledge (as shown by Tom). More generally, while it seems that most knowledge may 
be instrumentally valuable, this does not seem to be a promising approach to the Guiding 
Intuition. There we were looking for some valuable feature of knowledge that was 
distinctive among competitor doxastic propositional attitudes. Instrumental value has 
turned out to be poorly suited to that role. So where should we turn?  
 One possibility is to look elsewhere within the realm of extrinsic value—
specifically, by considering the possibility that knowledge is distinctively valuable because 
it bears indicator value. On this approach knowledge is not valuable in itself, but neither is 
it merely instrumentally valuable. Instead, knowledge is distinctively valuable because 
unlike other doxastic states, it indicates the presence of something finally or intrinsically 
valuable. Just what this further bearer of intrinsic value is and why knowledge indicates it 
while other states do not remains to be seen, but this is the approach favored by Olsson. 
Discussion of this approach will occupy chapter three. 
2.3 Acting Without Knowledge (Or Belief) 
What kinds of doxastic states can feed into our practical reasoning? The 
formulation of some extant theories of practical reason in terms of belief (or knowledge) 
gives rise to a natural question about the possibility of acting on the basis of non-belief 
doxastic states.53 Specifically, is there reason to restrict the doxastic states involved in 
successful or appropriate practical reasoning to belief or knowledge? Is it plausible to 
                                                
53 Williamson (2000) introduces discussion of the knowledge norm of action. See also Schecter (2017) for 
an evaluation of the related Williamsonian knowledge norm of assertion.  
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exclude credal states? Formal epistemologists or those who are ecumenical in their 
epistemological theorizing, welcoming both credences and beliefs, might well find 
hesitation over the possibility of acting on the basis of a credal state a puzzling kind of 
timidity, or perhaps a relic from an earlier era of theorizing that predated contemporary 
formal epistemology. They might be right. While credences are likely the most perspicuous 
case of a plausible doxastic state that adherents of views such as the Knowledge Norm of 
Action omit, the debate over beliefs and credences seems to me too fraught to be of great 
help when it comes to answering our question about acting without belief.  
Instead of focusing on credences, we can ask another question: can an agent act on 
the basis of a mere acceptance?54 Suppose a physicist is asked to make a prediction about 
the position of a thrown object. This physicist knows that a simple model which ignores, 
for example, drag, will be to some extent inaccurate for that very reason (suppose there is 
no compensatory mechanism for the force the theory glosses over). Nevertheless, despite 
her zero credence in the (perfect) accuracy of the model, she may, on the basis of the flawed 
model, predict the object’s later position with enough precision for some particular 
practical purpose (e.g., winning a bet). The prediction to which the model guides her, 
though false, suffices for practical success. 
She may go on, if questioned, to say that she acted on the basis of a model she 
knows to be inaccurate, based on a theory she knows to presuppose several false 
oversimplifications, but she nevertheless accepts the theory for the purpose at hand. These 
sorts of cases seem to me to be the most straightforward problem cases for the view that 
agents cannot act on the basis of mere acceptances. The physicist does not merely decry 
believing that the object will be precisely where the theory predicts it will be, but is in the 
                                                
54 As noted above, Patrick (1990) lays out the relationship between Van Fraassen’s notion of “acceptance” 
and belief.  
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stronger position of knowing that the object will not be (exactly) there, since she knows the 
theory on which the prediction is based is false (and false in a way that predictably 
precludes an accidentally true verdict in this case). So her nevertheless acting in accord 
with the theory (or, more awkwardly but more cautiously: acting indistinguishably from 
how one who did believe the theory would act) seems to show that it is possible for agents 
to act without the doxastic component of their action being a ‘full’ belief.  
It’s possible that the judicious application of some sophisticated epistemological 
machinery may avoid this sort of counterexample. One might reply that she reasons on the 
basis of her belief that the model is adequate for her purposes, or her belief that ‘the object 
will be very close to where the theory predicts it to be’. Still, while she may well have 
either or both of these beliefs, it is unclear that they are operative in her practical reasoning. 
Further recourse might be made to a dispositional theory of belief on which, at a rough 
pass, the agent’s disposition to act as if the theory is true just is their belief in the theory. 
Such an approach promises to collapse this family of alleged counterexamples.  
Either way, the upshot is clear. Tokens of any type of doxastic attitude or epistemic 
state which can feed into practical reasoning can be of instrumental value. It seems to me 
reasonable, for the kinds of considerations just raised, to interpret the class of doxastic 
attitudes and epistemic states that can play this role broadly. Whether one is convinced of 
this or not, it is clear that the broader one takes the class of (permissibly) practically 
actionable epistemic states to be, the less distinctive their instrumental value will be. If 
knowledge’s value is to be at least partially distinctive, as the Guiding Intuition indicates, 
this strongly suggests, although does not prove, that we ought to look beyond instrumental, 
practical value in our attempt to satisfy the Weak Guiding Intuition by appealing to 
knowledge. 
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2.4 Mere True Belief, Veritism, and Epistemic “Junk” 
At this point we’ve seen reason to conclude that true belief often but not always has 
instrumental value insofar as it helps agents accomplish their plans and satisfy their desires. 
We may still ask if it is plausible to hold that mere true belief has other non-instrumental 
value. Schematically, we are turning from trying to explain the value of true belief in terms 
of its instrumental value or nature as a kind of success to examining the possibility of 
holding mere true belief to be an intrinsic good (at least from the “epistemic point of 
view”). Is it intrinsically good to (merely) believe the truth? Given a certain understanding 
of Veritism, the view that the fundamental good in epistemic inquiry is the truth,55 it might 
seem plausible to respond affirmatively.  
One intuitive problem with this kind of view was put forward in a relatively well-
known way by Harman and later discussed influentially by Sosa, and Friedman, among 
others.56 Harman and others offer examples of agents who deliberately collect epistemic 
“junk”: allegedly valueless epistemic states. The older discussions focus on junky 
knowledge, typically, but it is not hard to imagine junky true belief.57 Imagine someone 
sitting alone on a long sandy beach on a pleasant day. They begin counting the grains of 
sand on the beach, building up their catalogue of knowledge. There are X grains of sand 
on this beach, this person silently affirms, then there are X+1 grains of sand on this beach, 
and so on. This case is similar in some ways to an idle disjunctivizer, who, having come to 
believe some truth, begins mentally affirming disjunctions of the true thing they believe 
with far-flung possibilities.58  
                                                
55 For more discussion, see Berker (2013) and Goldman (2015).  
56 See footnote 19. 
57 That is, if we set aside considerations to do with the nature of “mere true belief” discussed in section 2.1. 
58 Thanks to Daniel Eaton for this example. 
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One way to describe the strangeness of these kinds of behaviors relies on the 
(frequently challenged) distinction between implicit, or tacit, belief and explicit, or 
occurrent belief. Both agents are doing something odd in making what are at least normally 
recondite implicit beliefs occurrent. Surely for at least small values of X, the person sitting 
on the lonely beach already had sufficient (perceptual) evidence to warrant believing that 
the beach had that many grains of sand, and indeed if they had been asked, for example, 
whether or not the beach had five grains of sand on it, we should expect them to respond 
affirmatively and so attribute to them at the outset a dispositional belief with that content. 
Plausibly their perceptual evidence suffices to justify their occurrent belief to the threshold 
necessary for it to count as knowledge, barring any unusual additions to or stipulations 
about the case. So I think there are some difficulties involved in both the beach case and 
the idle disjunctivizer case, for parallel reasons. It’s just not clear that they are in fact 
gaining knowledge when they direct their thoughts in the ways described. 
At this point I will turn from trying to frame our inquiry into epistemic value to 
looking at one particular response to the Guiding Intuition on behalf of Process Reliabilism 
offered in a recent paper by Goldman and Olsson. Although other responses and 
supplementary suggestions have been offered,59 Olsson’s preferred response, the 
Conditional Probability Solution, is the most promising approach on offer for the Process 
Reliabilist, and has received the most critical attention. 
                                                
59 For example, Goldman’s own preferred response, “Value Autonomization”, from the same 2009 paper, 
but see also the exchanges between Olsson and Jager.  
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Chapter 3: The Swamping Problem and the Conditional Probability 
Solution 
3.1 The Swamping Problem 
Consider a toy version of reliabilism on which an agent S knows some proposition 
P if and only if the following three conditions are met:60 
 
1. P is true; 
2. S believes P; and 
3. S’s belief that P was produced through a reliable process. 
 
One suite of related objections to reliabilist accounts of knowledge, called the 
Swamping Problem, has to do with the relationship between the truth of the thing known 
and the reliability of the process by which S comes to know it.61 The swamper’s general 
strategy is to start either by assuming or arguing that knowledge has some important kind 
of value. They then try to show that the value of mere true belief is, or very nearly is, the 
same as the value of reliabilist ‘knowledge’. (Hence the name: the value of the veridicality 
of the belief state swamps any value reliability might add.) Swampers conclude that 
reliabilist ‘knowledge’ isn’t actually knowledge at all, since reliabilist ‘knowledge’ is not 
valuable enough to be genuine knowledge. 
   Here is how Swinburne puts the issue. By “the reliabilist requirement”, he means 
the central feature of reliabilism, captured above in our sketch of the view by condition (3): 
 
                                                
60 This is a slightly modified version of the model view Goldman and Olsson (2009) consider, omitting the 
anti-Gettier clause per their subsequent discussion. 
61 Jones (1997), Swinburne (1999), Zagzebki (1996; 2000; 2003), Kvanvig (2003), and others have offered 
related concerns as well, see Goldman and Olsson (2009) for further examples. 
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Now clearly it is a good thing that our beliefs satisfy the reliabilist requirement, 
for the fact that they do means that…they will probably be true. But, if a given 
belief of mine is true, I cannot see that it is any more worth having for satisfying 
the reliabilist requirement.62 
 
Zagzebski’s discussion makes the nub of the issue even more clear. She holds that, 
“[T]he reliability of the source of a belief cannot explain the difference in value between 
knowledge and true belief...”63 To see why, she offers a helpful analogy with espresso 
machines. Suppose we work in an office with two espresso machines, one which reliably 
produces tasty espresso and which only does so unreliably. If you ask me to get you a tasty 
espresso and I do so, there is a sense in which it does not seem to matter whether it came 
from the reliable or the unreliable machine. As Zagzebski sums up, “…If the espresso tastes 
good, it makes no difference if it comes from an unreliable machine…If the belief is true, 
it makes no difference if it comes from an unreliable belief-producing source”.64 
The proponent of the swamping problem suggests that succeeding with regard to 
tastiness swamps, or overwhelms, the value of the reliability of the source of the espresso, 
if indeed the reliability lends any value at all. And so the story goes with regards to truth 
and reliability, according to Zagzebski, Swinburne, and others.  
Helpfully, Goldman and Olsson are very clear about their understanding of the 
challenge they intend to respond to, and characterize it this way: 
 
What Zagzebski is saying is that the value of a good espresso is not raised by the 
fact that it was produced by a reliable espresso machine if taste is all that matters; 
and, likewise, the value of a true belief is not raised by the fact that it was 
produced through a reliable process if truth is all that matters. [Italics original.]65 
	
                                                
62 Swinburne (1999), page 58. 
63 Zagzebski (2003), page 13. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Goldman and Olsson (2009). 
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Here Goldman and Olsson emphasize a somewhat unusual feature of the standard 
interpretation of the swamping problem, on which reliability is taken not to contribute any 
value at all. (Their explanation of this is that Zagzebski’s analogy reveals that she is 
assuming that truth is all that matters in inquiry.) Although this is not essential to offering 
a swamping-type challenge, framing the issue this way simplifies matters immensely. 
Before embracing this simplification it is worth noting that several extant versions of the 
swamping problem are precisified in ways that build in the idea Goldman and Olsson draw 
attention to, that reliability, in the end, adds no value to a true belief. 
Specifically, Goldman and Olsson write that, “Once truth is in place, its value 
appears to swamp the value of reliability, thus making the combination of truth and 
reliability no more valuable than truth itself”.66 There doesn’t appear to be a temporal 
reading of “once” here that makes sense. If we read “once” above as meaning something 
like ‘given that’, Goldman and Olsson’s view seems to be that whatever value reliability 
may add does not survive contact with the truth of the belief. They, and others, seem to 
think of swamping in terms of deletion or cancellation. It is possible to hold that the value 
of a complex state is not always equivalent to the sum of the values of the constituent parts 
of that state, but principles like these are neither mentioned nor invoked.67  
There’s at least some temptation to interpret claims of the form ‘Consideration A 
swamps consideration B’ in the same way we would interpret claims of the form 
‘Consideration A overwhelms consideration B’, with the implication that B had some 
weight to it. When we explain our decisions by saying things like, “my promise to help my 
friend move outweighed my desire to watch the game”, we have set up the issue in a way 
that seems to acknowledge a countervailing force. The precisifications of the Swamping 
                                                
66 Ibid. 
67 Although see Allen (2003) for a discussion of Moore on organic unity.  
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Problem we will look at it lose this part of the challenge to reliabilism, presumably in order 
to preserve simplicity. And while simplicity is valuable, it is worth noting that given the 
swamper’s strategy as outlined above, this simplification is for them purely a convenience. 
The swamper could equally well argue that the value added by reliability, while non-zero, 
does not suffice to grant reliabilist ‘knowledge’ the advantage in terms of value over true 
belief we ought to expect. (In Swinburne’s terms, this approach would acknowledge that 
our beliefs are only slightly more worth having for satisfying the reliabilist’s requirement.)  
 The simple version of the swamping problem that Goldman and Olsson consider, 
which holds that reliability adds no value to a true belief, seems to have sacrificed some of 
the intuitive appeal of the swamper’s objection. It simply isn’t necessary to get the 
objection running that one hold that reliability adds no value to true belief. It suffices for 
the objector’s purpose if the value added by a reliable process of belief formation is so 
trivial that the value added by truth swamps the value added by reliability, where “swamps” 
is interpreted to mean something like ‘dramatically outweighs’. Reliabilist ‘knowledge’, 
according to such an objector, would not be knowledge at all, faring only marginally better 
than mere true belief in terms of value, and so, by appeal to something like the Guiding 
Intuition or perhaps the intuition behind Pritchard’s Tertiary Value Problem, inapt as an 
account of knowledge. 
Of course the attack would be cleaner if the swamper could show that reliability is 
truly valueless, or if one was willing to assume that only truth matters in inquiry, as 
Goldman and Olsson take Zagzebski to do. The swamper would not then be occupying the 
middle ground, holding on the one hand that reliability is valuable in at least some 
epistemically relevant sense, while on the other withholding from states that bear this value 
(and which meet the other relevant criteria) the title of knowledge. The prima facie 
awkwardness involved in holding this view does not seem to me to amount to a serious 
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objection against it though, and it preserves both the intuitive force of the swamper’s 
objection (that there is not enough distance between reliable true belief and mere true 
belief) as well as the weighty body of intuitive evidence suggesting that reliability of belief 
formation often simply suffices as justification for knowledge (these would be the 
intuitions suggesting that in non-demon world, non-Norman style cases, simple reliabilism 
seems like a satisfyingly explanatory account of knowledge). Whether these considerations 
lead one to prefer the more complex version of the swamping problem or not, it is worth 
pointing out that there is another way to run the objection.   
Swinburne’s remark in particular seems to me helpful in understanding how some 
swampers see the key issue. He seems to suggest a comparison between two cases along 
roughly these lines. We shall hold fixed that my belief that P is true in both, only adjusting 
the etiology of that belief. In one case it is the result of a highly reliable belief formation 
process, and in the other, it is the result of an unreliable one. Swinburne asks what the sense 
is in which  I am better off in the former case than the latter. One straightforward way for 
me to be better or worse off would be for me to have some information about my epistemic 
states. If I were to know that I knew that P, or came to the belief that P reliably in the former 
case, or if I were to learn that I came to believe P flukily in the latter case, it seems clear 
that I would be better positioned to put my epistemic state to practical use in the former 
case than the latter. In the former case I might become more confident that P, or my belief 
that P might become more resilient, more resistant to certain kinds of defeat. In the latter I 
might even abandon my true belief that P, or my belief that P might simply become modally 
weaker, easier to dislodge by rebuttal or the application of sophistical pressure. 
These all seem like relatively straightforward ways in which I might be better or 
worse off in one or the other of Swinburne’s pair of cases. But Swinburne tells us that he 
“cannot see” how his belief is better for being reliable, which strongly suggests that he is 
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focusing narrowly on the belief itself, and excluding these sorts of meta-level epistemic 
states. Like other epistemic states, etiological reliability isn’t ‘luminous’: we are not 
infallible detectors of the reliability of the process that led to our beliefs. Perhaps if 
reliability were luminous, the swamping problem would not be compelling. But without 
some kind of direct access to the facts about the reliability of the process that led to the 
formation of the belief in question, we are left wondering whether two individuals with 
doxastic states that are indistinguishable from an internal perspective differ in terms of 
value. Swinburne here seems at least tempted by a negative response. Although the two 
cases differ dramatically in the kinds of evaluations we should make from a third-personal 
point of view (after all, according to the reliabilist, one is a case of knowledge while the 
other a mere true belief), for the subjects involved there is no detectable difference--there 
is simply the belief that P.68 So it seems strange to hold that the one state is of greater value 
than the other while focusing narrowly on the beliefs themselves and not meta-level 
epistemic states or the distant consequences of the two states, as Swinburne seems to do. 
Another related way to press a swamping style worry has to do with some familiar 
considerations about the nature of reliability itself. Reliability comes in degrees, but the 
justification it confers is either sufficient for knowledge or not. If we assume that we can 
give relatively fine-grained analyses of the reliability of the processes that led to the 
adoption of our beliefs (especially plausible if we construe reliability as a long-run 
historical notion although not implausible if we take reliability to be best understood 
counterfactually) then we should be able to compare beliefs formed by the most reliable 
unreliable process and the least reliable reliable process. Though we can imagine a 
reliability theorist settling on an arbitrary stipulative threshold in order to have a fully 
                                                
68 As before, I am setting aside Williamsonian questions about the nature of the relationship between belief 
and knowledge.  
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determinate theory--suppose 80 percent, 76.5 percent, or 51 percent reliable, this detail is 
irrelevant--it is difficult to accept that such a stipulative threshold marks a bright-line 
distinction in the value of the belief produced by a process that barely meets the reliability 
threshold when compared to one that only very narrowly misses it. 
3.2 The Conditional Probability Solution  
In responding to the swamping problem as their opponents put it to them, Goldman 
and Olsson take their task to be showing that knowledge has some extra value over and 
above that of true belief:69 they label the challenge to which they hope to respond the 
EVOK, or Extra Value Of Knowledge. This is noteworthy in that they only aspire to show 
that knowledge has more value than true belief, not an importantly different kind of value 
as some (e.g., Kvanvig, Pritchard’s Tertiary Value Problem) have hoped for, nor a great 
deal more value (as it would take to satisfy the more sophisticated version of the Swamping 
Problem just discussed). 
Their response to the swamping problem is an attempt to show that knowledge 
satisfying clause (3) above, what Swinburne called “the reliabilist requirement”, gives us 
a state that exceeds the value of true belief just in terms of the value of truth. Although the 
extra value Goldman and Olsson locate for reliabilist knowledge is subtly different from 
the kind of value possessed by mere true beliefs, it too eventually reduces to a matter of 
apprehending truths. This means their response doesn’t require them to assert that, (and so 
does not require us to consider whether) reliability per se has any special epistemic value 
of its own, thus avoiding the main thrust of the Swamping problem altogether.  
                                                
69 For a helpful taxonomy of other challenges to the value of knowledge, see Pritchard (2007), discussed at 
length in sections 1.3 and 1.4. 
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They call their response to the swamping problem the conditional probability 
solution, and it is admirably simple. Given the simplified reliabilist view stated above in 
(1)-(3), an agent who knows that P came to that knowledge by using a reliable belief 
formation process. Given that some “empirical regularities”70 are in place, that agent’s 
coming to know P per reliabilism means that they deployed a belief forming method that 
is likely, if deployed again, to yield future true beliefs in relevantly similar circumstances.71 
As Goldman and Olsson put it, “…the probability of having more true belief…in the future 
is greater conditional on S’s knowing that P than conditional on S’s merely truly believing 
that P” (28).  
This feature of reliabilist knowledge, according to Goldman and Olsson, gives that 
state Indicator Value. As mentioned above, Indicator Value is a kind of extrinsic value 
borne by objects or states when those states indicate the presence of some other object or 
state which is itself valuable. In this case, token beliefs have indicator value because they 
indicate the presence of a reliable belief forming process. Given the way we’ve set up this 
toy version of Reliabilism, it will be true that any case of putative reliabilist knowledge 
will indicate a reliable belief forming mechanism. But is this mechanism valuable?  
Goldman and Olsson’s opponents have granted that true belief has value, as is 
plausible. Given this, it would be at least awkward to hold that true belief is valuable but 
                                                
70 For example, that the belief forming method is not unusually unique, can in principle be used again in 
the future, is such that an agent is likely to deploy it again, and so on. See Goldman and Olsson (2009), and 
section 3.3 for further discussion. 
71 There are serious open questions for even sophisticated reliabilist theories of knowledge to do with 
belief-formation process individuation and evaluation, usually called the generality problem for reliabilism. 
Conee and Feldman’s “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism” (1998) is the classic statement of the issue. 
See Goldman’s “Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology” (1993) for the makings of an agent-
reliabilist approach to a potential solution. Although there are several current proposals being worked on as 
responses to the generality problem, none is yet widely accepted. Still, the fact that there are open problems 
for reliabilism does not preclude its being valuable in its role here to suggest the extent of one plausible 
externalist response to questions of epistemic value.	 
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that the prospect of getting more true beliefs in the future is of no value.72 The swampers 
Goldman and Olsson engage also deny that reliabilist justification a la clause (3) above 
grants any value in itself. The conditional probability solution, as Goldman and Olsson are 
quick to point out, is “silent” on this point. Their CPS requires only this slight extension of 
the idea that true beliefs are valuable in order to get off the ground. Still, we can ask whether 
or not this maneuver is a satisfying response to Swinburne’s complaint. Does this recondite 
extrinsic feature of a particular reliably-formed belief make the belief itself “more worth 
having”, or have we instead found that it is better to have the belief? 
3.3 Evaluating the Success of the Conditional Probability Solution 
The conditional probability solution seems to me to succeed as far as it goes: 
specifically, it seems to succeed as a response to the EVOK problem. This is not to say that 
the conditional probability solution is deeply satisfying. It carries with it several important 
limitations. Although Goldman and Olsson may have succeeded in responding to the task 
they set themselves—to show that a simplified reliabilist view can show that knowledge 
(although only in a generic sense) has more value than true belief, given some plausible 
assumptions—their doing so falls far short of what other philosophers have suggested we 
look for in an account of knowledge’s value. 
One cause for concern is that the conditional probability solution only vindicates 
what Goldman and Olsson call a “generic” value for knowledge. By this, it is meant that 
                                                
72 This is not to assert a false piece of value theory, viz., that adding more of a valuable item always results 
in more value. Although that principle is arguably false in general, it is unclear why we would think it 
would fail to apply in the relevant case. One might have a Harman-style concern about accruing valueless 
“junk” true beliefs, but the kinds of cases that makes Harman’s thought most plausible have to do with an 
agent, for example, idly disjunctivising as discussed in section 2.4. This is at least not typical behavior, and 
as we shall soon see Goldman and Olsson do not defend what Kvanvig (2003) has called a “categorical” 
account of the value of knowledge but instead only a weaker “generic” account. For Harmanian type issues 
to arise at this point one would need to think that most belief acquisition is (or could be in relevant cases) 
junky. This is implausible. 
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most instances of knowledge carry the value that they think EVOK tells us to look for. On 
their view, some reliabilist knowledge is such that the agent’s coming to know some 
proposition does not increase the chances that they will end up with future true beliefs, 
either because the prompt to which they responded in coming to believe was particularly 
unusual, or the method they employed to form the belief in question was unlikely to be 
used again in the future. In these cases, reliabilist knowledge, even by Goldman and 
Olsson’s own lights, is no more valuable than mere true belief. This means that the CPS is 
not going to appeal to theorists (Kvanvig, etc.) who seek a resolution to the question of 
epistemic value on which knowledge is always, as opposed to merely usually, valuable. 
  Goldman and Olsson are conveniently explicit about their goals. Their EVOK 
problem calls for only extra value, not value of a particular different kind. Some 
epistemologists, attracted to what Pritchard calls the Tertiary Value Problem, have offered 
that the deep challenge we face is to show why knowledge is not just more valuable, but 
valuable in a different way than other doxastic attitudes or epistemic states, such as, true 
belief, are valuable. Kvanvig discusses the idea that knowledge is categorically valuable; 
that is, important in a way that is distinctive when compared to other doxastic attitudes. 
While reliabilist knowledge, per the conditional probability solution, is valuable for reasons 
that differ from the reasons for which true beliefs are valuable, these different reasons only 
have to do with the likely acquisition of future true beliefs. There is only one item of deep, 
fundamental value reflected in the proposal Goldman and Olsson offer, and that is 
believing the truth. So while it is true that the conditional probability solution shows that 
knowledge has added value by having all the value of believing the truth as well as value 
that derives from an extra, less direct connection to truth via the reliable belief formation 
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faculty,73 it seems unlikely this will satisfy philosophers who sought out a sense in which 
knowledge’s value is distinctive or categorical.74 
Further, because it is offered in response to the EVOK problem, the conditional 
probability solution is only responsive to one kind of swamping challenge to reliabilism. 
As discussed, on the version of the Swamping challenge pushed by Zagzebski et al., all the 
value of knowledge is explainable in terms of the value of truth. Whatever other conditions 
knowledge carries, including justification or an anti-Gettier clause, can add no value. But 
as discussed above, a second understanding of the Swamping challenge is possible, and to 
my mind more natural. On this version, what we mean when we object to Reliabilism on 
the grounds that the value of truth swamps the value of knowledge is that the gap between 
the value of a mere true belief and the value of reliabilist knowledge is too small—not that 
there is no difference between their values. Truth’s value swamps the value of e.g. 
justification or anti-Gettier conditions by being overwhelmingly greater, not because those 
features contribute nothing once combined with truth.  
On this second version of the swamping problem, the swamper does not deny that 
reliabilist ‘knowledge’ is more valuable than mere true belief, but instead holds that while 
there is a difference, it is altogether too small to vindicate the intuition that knowledge holds 
a place of prestige in terms of epistemic value. While Goldman and Olsson are keen to read 
Zagzebski and other swampers as primarily interested in truth and truth-conduciveness, 
this might be a mistake. If the swampers are really looking for something other than 
reliability which does make a belief more worth having, they may well be looking for just 
                                                
73 Kvanvig (2003) makes a relevant point about value and mereology that seems to have been overlooked 
by Goldman and Olsson (and others). Kvanvig rightly insists that it does not suffice to show merely that 
knowledge is a composite state with multiple valuable parts. We must further offer independent reason to 
think that these values will complement, rather than interfere with or detract from, each other. Sylvan’s 
discussion (2018) takes up this issue. 
74 It straightforwardly abandons the categorical value claim, though we have already seen some reason to 
doubt the categorical value of knowledge due to Harmanian junk-type concerns in section 2.4. 
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the sort of broadly internalist features Kvanvig notes offer a promising approach to the 
value of knowledge, such as the ability to defend, explain, or offer reasons in defense of 
one’s belief.  
Relatedly,  the extent to which the indicator value that makes up the heart of the 
conditional probability solution is a satisfying response to Swinburne’s question about the 
“belief itself” is unclear. On Goldman and Olsson’s analysis, the feature that turns out to 
bear the extra value we sought is an extrinsic feature of the belief. Arguably the belief itself 
has not been shown to exceed the value of true belief; instead, what we have learned is that 
some beliefs are connected to a new perhaps unexpected source of epistemic value--belief 
formation faculties of a certain kind. And it seems clear that it is these underlying features 
that are directly responsible for the indicator value reliabilist knowledge has been argued 
to (generally) have. So it seems to me possible that if one was gripped by Swinburne’s 
concern as exposed above, and was willing to narrowly focusing on the “belief itself” and 
not the downstream consequences or extrinsic properties of the belief, one might argue that 
we have not really shown knowledge to have any extra value at all. Rather, we’ve made an 
adjacent discovery about the value of some belief-forming faculties.75 Instead of a 
vindication of knowledge, we’ve instead shifted our attention away from doxastic attitudes 
altogether towards agential capacities of a certain sort. While this does seem to suffice as 
a response to the EVOK problem as Goldman and Olsson set it up, this can seem to say 
more about their framing of the problem than their resolution of it. This approach would 
require some delicate footwork, since it seems to force us to deny that indicator value adds 
value, but it is available.  
                                                
75 For a parallel argument about the value of modal features of knowledge (safety and sensitivity), see 
Gardiner (2017).  
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Whether one takes the strident response just discussed to the CPS or not, it seems 
unlikely that the CPS will satisfy swampers despite solving the EVOK problem, because 
the swampers are after more than just another unusual kind of extrinsic value. Kvanvig, for 
example, wants a view on which knowledge has categorical value. Zagzebski is interested 
in a view that ties knowledge more closely to virtues like wisdom. Due to their mistaken 
reading of their interlocutors as primarily focused on truth, Goldman and Olsson’s work 
simply does not engage with the deeper considerations that seem to be motivating their 
critics. To invoke Pritchard’s terminology, Goldman and Olsson’s narrow focus on 
responding to the Primary Value Problem by showing that knowledge has a bit of extra 
value isn’t dialectically effective because their interlocutors seem to accept the Tertiary 
Value Problem. Before turning to my positive proposal, there is one more point I’d like to 
make about the CPS and its limitations. 
3.4 Framing the Generality Problem 
The Generality Problem is worth attending to in this context not in order to draw 
attention to serious, although familiar, difficulties for Process Reliabilist theories of 
knowledge, but in order to show that the Generality Problem bears on the discussion of the 
value problem, and in particular the CPS, in ways that so far are undiscussed. I think the 
criticism outlined in section 3.3 suffices to show that the CPS is unsatisfying as a response 
to the value problem, but here I will introduce the issues I see surrounding the Generality 
problem as an auxiliary line of attack. The upshot is that the CPS is at best incomplete: its 
current presentation runs roughshod over a crucial distinction, and thereby presupposes a 
particularly strong response to the Generality Problem.  
Per Reliabilism, to find out whether some agent S is justified in believing that P, 
we look to the process that led the formation of the belief that P. If that process is reliable 
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(and some other conditions hold, for example, an anti-Gettier condition) then S is justified 
in believing P. Although this proposal is admirably simple and commands significant 
intuitive force, careful philosophical attention has revealed that this story glosses over an 
important distinction. Beliefs are not delivered ex nihilo; they are formed as a result of 
processes at least some of which, plausibly, are or supervene on physical processes in the 
brain of the believer.76, 77 This process (or group of processes) produce the belief. Following 
Conee and Feldman, we can call it (or them) the Token Belief Formation Process. Although 
it may seem ungainly to refer to tokenings of processes, this is not worth muddying the 
waters over. We can take the name to indicate (i) their tight connection with the token 
belief into which we are inquiring, and (ii) the fact that we will later need to speak of these 
Token Belief Formation Processes as instances of more general types of processes. 
Although the terminology might be thought to be unfortunate, all that is required is that 
when we inquire into a token belief, we accept that some particular process (of brain 
activity, mental activity, or both) led to its adoption. The particular series of events that led 
to the adoption of such a token belief is all that the term ‘Token Belief Formation Process’ 
is meant to indicate. 
There is an important sense in which Token Belief Formation Processes are not a 
good fit for the Reliabilist machinery. Reliabilism tells us that when we are wondering 
whether a belief is justified, we ought to proceed by assessing the reliability of the process 
that led to the production of that belief. We have just seen that token beliefs will be the 
                                                
76 It is tempting to add that these physical processes lead to a mental event or cause (or are) a transition of 
thought that leads to the adoption of some belief, but some prefer to think of beliefs are bare dispositions 
and would regard this addition as misled. Whether one prefers a story including more mental or physical 
elements does not affect the core of the Generality Problem, only the way it is set up. 
77 Klein’s discussion (1999), inspired by Sosa’s account of the “kinds” of knowledge we should attribute to 
thermostats, which do not have brains, should I think be taken metaphorically, and so not construed as a 
serious objection to the supposition here that the processes that lead to the formation/adoption of a belief 
are, partially are, or supervene on, brain states, neural activity, and so on. 
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causal result of Token Belief Formation Processes (TBFPs). These TBFPs, though, will 
not give rise to interesting reliability facts. We are asking about some particular series of 
synaptic events and/or mental transitions. As “tokens”, or, less clumsily, individual 
processes, we can say about them only that they led to the adoption of a veridical or a non-
veridical belief. If forced to respond to a question about their reliability, the most we could 
say of the TBFPs, as they are necessarily singly-instantiatable, would be that those that led 
to veridical beliefs are perfectly reliable, having led to true beliefs, and of the TBFPs that 
led to non-veridical beliefs that they are perfectly unreliable, having led to false beliefs.78 
A view that took the processes that the Reliabilist theory assesses to be TBFPs would surely 
be a monstrous misconstrual of Reliabilism, and would result in devastating extensional 
errors, assuming only that one countenances justified false beliefs or (even less 
contentiously) unjustified true beliefs. To make sense of the insight motivating Reliabilism, 
we need to embed the TBFP within a broader category or type, something multiply 
instantiated, so that this new, broader thing could give rise to the kinds of interesting 
reliability facts the view plausibly instructs us to seek out.  
Put differently, TBFPs will look like, for example, some neural activity in an agent 
followed by the adoption of a belief. This isn’t the sort of thing the Reliabilist wanted to 
make justificatory facts a function of in the first place. Luckily, a natural response suggests 
itself. We can embed Token Belief Formation Processes into categories called Belief 
                                                
78 Alston’s (1995) distinction between counterfactual and long-run or historical reliability does not help us 
here. In assessing a TBFP we are evaluating this or that particular series of events. The long-run or 
historical reliability of these processes will only ever include their single deliverance. The counterfactual 
question, what would have happened if an agent were to form a belief on the basis of this very TBFP, only 
seems to result in the agent’s forming a belief with a content that matches the content of the belief they in 
fact formed. I do not take this to be an alarming determinism but instead a straightforward result of the 
fine-grainedness of the TBFP. To expect the counterfactual reliability of a TBFP to vary is just to accept 
that this very chain of synaptic activity and so on could have resulted in a different belief. This seems to me 
implausible. 
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Formation Process Types (BFPTs).79 Unlike TBFPs, These BFPTs will include just the 
sorts of things Reliabilism enjoins us to look to when searching for something to underwrite 
the reliability facts.80 Perception, visual perception, visual perception in normal lighting, 
assessing one’s evidence, and so on will all be BFPTs.81 These are all examples of BFPTs 
into which Token Belief Formation Processes can be sorted. And because BFPTs can be 
multiply instantiated (modally or long-run/historically, whichever one prefers), we can 
fruitfully ask how reliable a Belief Formation Process Type is. Unlike TBFPs which can 
only return reliability results of 0 or 1, BFPTs can return results from 0 to 1 inclusive, just 
as the Reliabilist would’ve hoped.82  
Hopefully everything to this point seems like a friendly, if somewhat unwieldy, 
clarification. The simple statement of Process Reliabilism above required us to asses 
                                                
79 Again, following Conee and Feldman. 
80 There is some controversy over whether to construe the objects of reliability analysis modally or non-
modally, by taking processes (Process Types, in the language of Conee and Feldman) to be individuated 
counterfactually or long-run/historically. Alston offers a compelling argument that the long-run/historical 
approach opens the Reliability theory up to bootstrapping concerns, but it is not clear whether the modal 
approach encounters problems of its own. Whichever option one prefers, the Generality Problem will still 
have teeth. 
81 When Goldman introduces the Reliability theory the types of processes he takes the theory to assess are 
very revealing; he takes it that justification will be a matter of whether or not a token belief is the result of 
for example, “good reasoning”. It seems to me that this feature of his presentation is responsible for much 
of the intuitive appeal of the view. It can sound almost definitional to say that a belief is justified if it is the 
result of good reasoning. I am somewhat concerned as to whether or not it is good practice to admit types 
of this intuitive kind without making their extension more clear by making their meanings more precise, but 
it seems to me the proponent of the Generality Problem can admit them without affecting the argument. 
More would need to be said to relate the Agent/Virtue Reliabilist-like view Goldman proposes in his 
“Folkways and Scientific Epistemology” to these issues. Such a view can forestall the Generality Problem 
by limiting the number of BFPTs. A proponent of Generality-like concerns might have to preclude the 
Agent/Virtue Reliabilist from listing their Agential or Virtuous BFPTs on the grounds that either (i) the 
short list of BFPTs the Agent/Virtue Reliabilist offers is arbitrary, or (ii) that those BFPTs cannot be 
individuated in a principled way from extensionally indistinguishable non-virtuous/agentially virtuous 
BFPTs. (e.g., believing P because one used good reasoning sounds virtuous, but believing P because is 
instantiating one of many disjuncts in a lengthy disjunction of all the instances captured by “good 
reasoning” doesn’t sound virtuous. Our inability to disambiguate between these in a principled way just is 
the Generality Problem, on my view, as explained below.) 
82 This should not lead us to consider abandoning TBFPs, though: while TBFPs cannot give rise to 
interesting reliability facts, BFPTs cannot be causally efficacious. It is the tokens, not the types, that must 
cause beliefs, but the types, and not the tokens, that must be assessed for reliability. 
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processes for reliability and to use these to generate justifcatory verdicts with regards to 
beliefs. This statement overlooked an important point to do with the difference between a 
belief’s proximate causal process, which cannot itself interestingly be assessed for 
reliability, and a larger group of relevantly related causal processes, which can. Fair 
enough: the Reliabilist need only look to the latter. But everything needed to run the 
Generality Problem has now been established. We need only note that each Token Belief 
Formation Processes will instantiate many--indefinitely many--Belief Formation Process 
Types, and that these BFPTs will vary wildly in their reliability. So for one and the same 
belief, Reliabilism is left in the awkward position of seeming ready to return many contrary 
verdicts. Further amendment is clearly required, and the general direction of that 
amendment seems clear. We need to add to Reliabilism a mechanism that selects which 
BFPT to assess for reliability. The Generality Problem is the task of giving an account of 
this selector. 
3.5 The Conditional Probabilty Solution and the Generality Problem 
Goldman and Olsson posit four “empirical regularities” that need to be in force in 
order for their Conditional Probability Solution (CPS) to show that knowledge has 
indicator value. Their claim with regard to these regularities is not that they are always met, 
but that they are satisfied at least some large portion of the time, a large enough portion to 
make the claim that “knowledge is valuable,” understood as a generic rather than universal 
claim, true (or whatever passes for truth in the case of apt generic claims). These four 
regularities are called non-uniqueness, cross-temporal access, learning, and generality. 
Although Goldman and Olsson are not explicit about the distinction between Token Belief 
Formation Processes (TBFPs) and Belief Formation Process Types (BFPTs), I will use 
these notions to precisify their brief remarks, discussing each of these regularities in turn 
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and showing why Goldman and Olsson see them as limiting the range of cases in which 
they take the CPS to assign indicator value to knowledge. 
Non-uniqueness has to do with “problems” agents face, where a problem seems to 
be something like a situation that prompts the formation of a belief. The idea here is that 
the CPS relies on the possibility of instantiating a BFPT multiple times. If the agent fails 
ever to form a belief, Q, as a result of a TBFP that instantiates the same BFPT as some 
temporally earlier belief, P, then the agent, S, in knowing P, is not in a state that has 
indicator value. This follows because on the Conditional Probability Solution, S’s knowing 
that P is valuable because this knowledge is indicative of S having recourse to some BFPT 
that S can employ again. If S forms the belief that R in response to a unique problem, even 
if S comes to know that R, this state will not have any indicator value in the sense CPS 
assigns, because S will never have another opportunity to employ a TBFP that instantiates 
the BFPT that lead to83 their belief that R, by, the uniqueness of the problem that led to the 
formation of R. So non-uniqueness limits the scope of the CPS by telling us that knowledge 
formed in response to unique problems has no indicator value. 
Cross-Temporal Access tells us that S’s knowledge that R is only valuable in the 
sense picked out by the CPS when the TBFP that S employed in coming to believe R is an 
instantiation of a BFPT that can in principle be “accessed” or instantiated again in the 
future. If, for example, we are considering whether or not S’s knowledge that R is valuable 
and we assume that this knowledge is the result of a Token Belief Formation Process that 
is an instantiation of a Belief Formation Process Type that is somewhat like Φ2 above, 
except that this process type is in principle unable to be instantiated in the future again, 
then the CPS will not hold that S’s knowledge that R has indicator value. Where 
                                                
83 As the above section attempted to show, making this claim seems, in a strict sense, disallowed. We lack 
a principled way to point to the BFPT that a given TBFP instantiates in the way that matters for Reliabilist 
justification. 
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Uniqueness ruled out cases of agents confronting “problems” they would not face again as 
cases where CPS would assign indicator value, Cross-Temporal Access rules out cases 
where an agent is confronted with a non-unique problem, but solves it by recourse to a 
BFPT that they cannot in principle “access” again--by using a ‘unique’ problem solving 
method, so to speak. Without being able to use the BFPT84 that led to an agent’s knowing 
that P again, CPS cannot assign their knowledge that P any indicator value. 
What further restrictions should we place on the CPS? So far, Goldman and Olsson 
have told us that the CPS assigns indicator value to Reliabilist knowledge when an agent 
solves a non-unique problem by a method that they can in principle access at a later time. 
The next “regularity” or “assumption” is Learning. They give the learning regularity in this 
form, where S is an agent and M is a “method”85 used to solve a problem: “By the learning 
assumption, S is likely to make use of M again [when S is confronted with a problem of 
the same type that they used M to resolve earlier].” The Learning constraint, then, extends 
the CPS by requiring that for a piece of knowledge to have indicator value it must not only 
arise as a result of an instance of a non-unique problem solved in a cross-temporally 
accessible way, but that the knowledge be the result of a kind of cross-temporally 
accessible method that an agent is likely to use again just when they are confronted with 
other problems of a similar type.86  
                                                
84 As above. 
85 “Methods” as Goldman as Olsson use them are ambiguous between TBFPs and BFPTs in Conee and 
Feldman’s language. Put differently, Goldman and Olsson are adding the CPS to just the sort of Reliabilist 
view that Conee and Feldman complain elides the distinction between process tokens and process types. 
86 There is a confusing exchange in a pair of papers between Olsson and Jager on just this point. Jager 
seems to accuse Olsson of having conceded in correspondence that Olsson took the Learning constraint to 
be pseudo-internalist: in order to satisfy the learning constraint, the agent needs to learn, in some sense, the 
method used to arrive at the belief. This is a significant departure from orthodox Reliabilist externalism, 
and an unnecessary complication to the CPS. All Goldman and Olsson need is that the agent is in fact likely 
to redeploy their problem-solving method, or perhaps that they in fact will redeploy the method, not that 
they need access to their belief formation processes or to bear any attitude towards them. So “learning” is 
probably a misleading name for this criterion. 
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The final regularity is Generality, which is introduced as follows, where M, again, 
is a method used to solve a problem: “By generality, M is likely to be reliable for solving 
that similar future problem as well”. So it seems generality is just the assertion that methods 
for solving different problems of the same type are likely to be reliable for all problems of 
that type given that they are reliable for solving any problem of that type. Whether 
Generality is best understood as a regularity in its own right or as a complication of Non-
uniqueness isn’t perfectly clear. One might think that in Generality we are just getting a 
clarification of the somewhat opaque term of art “problem”.87 
At this point we have the entire set of restrictions on the scope of the CPS that 
Goldman and Olsson lay out. Knowledge has indicator value just where S knows that P on 
the basis of a method M that responds to a non-unique problem, M is in principle accessible 
for S in the future, S is likely to re-deploy M when confronted with future problems of the 
same type, and M is likely to be reliable when used in connection with those future 
problems. I see two primary issues here. First, as stated, the empirical regularities Goldman 
and Olsson discuss presuppose a perspicuous solution to the Generality Problem. Second, 
their presentation of these regularities belies a lack of attention to the distinction between 
TBFPs and BFPTs. 
                                                
87 It’s also worth noting the strength of the particular claim Olsson and Goldman make. They do not claim 
that a method M that is reliable with regard to solving a particular problem will be a reliable method for 
solving future problems of the same type, but instead that M is likely to be reliable for future problems of 
that type. By the other constraints outlined above, the CPS would assign indicator value only where an 
agent confronts a non-unique problem by employing a method they could in principle use again and are 
likely to redeploy. But Generality, as stated, guarantees us only that this method is likely to be reliable. So 
it could be unreliable. But this would mean that in these cases, where M is in fact unreliable, the CPS 
would assign indicator value to a belief-forming method that will not lead to future knowledge. This seems 
contrary to the spirit of the proposal and the apparent intention of the other three constraints on the CPS 
Goldman and Olsson lay out. It’s possible that this stipulation, that a method would likely be reliable, 
rather than the assurance that it would be reliable, is motivated by concerns about the individuation of 
problem types, perhaps for reasons similar to the type individuation problems surrounding the Generality 
Problem. 
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Tackling the first issue first, why is it that these regularities presuppose not just a 
solution to the Generality Problem, but a strong solution? In addition to their role in 
constraining the valuable kinds of knowledge, these four criteria might be thought of as, or 
related to, desiderata on a solution to the Generality Problem. These are just the sorts of 
features of a BFPT that might make it appealing, or that might highlight a BFPT as the sort 
of type that features in our pretheoretical picture of thinking and reasoning. But stating 
these constraints does not offer us progress towards a solution. It is well and good to say 
that we might want a solution to the Generality Problem to highlight the kinds of processes 
that would satisfy the empirical regularities Goldman and Olsson stipulate--to be accessible 
cross-temporally and general to some reasonable standard. But this is not the difficulty we 
face in confronting the Generality Problem. It is not that we lack plausible BFPT 
candidates, but instead that selecting among the various BPFTs that a given TBFP 
instantiates requires solving a very difficult problem to do with the naturalness (and, very 
likely, the relevance) of process types. So to say that we should look to, for example, cross-
temporally accessible process types, while a reasonable thought, is not a suggestion that 
promises progress with regard to the the crux of the Generality Problem. We already knew 
we wanted an answer with that feature. But there will be indefinitely many BFPTs with 
that feature that any given TBFP will instantiate.  
The second difficulty is that much of what is said by Goldman and Olsson elides 
the distinction between TBFPs and BFPTs. “Methods” are ambiguous between TBFPs and 
BFPTs in just the way that the careful work of Conee and Feldman, and others, should’ve 
warned us against. To understand Goldman and Olsson’s constraints, particularly Cross-
Temporal Access and Learning, we must read methods as BFPTs, but their work seems to 
rely on the idea that for any one belief there is only one or only one operative BFPT at play, 
as opposed to the unique TBFP that led to the adoption of that belief. And this is just the 
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assumption that the Generality Problems reveals to be misleading. Not only is there always 
more than one BFPT into which a given TBFP can be sorted, none of the BFPTs are 
operative in the sense of being directly causally responsible for the adoption of a token 
belief. Only TBFPs stand in this direct causal relationship to beliefs. So the infelicity of 
arguing that we can “use” a belief forming method, where ‘method’ is read as a BFPT, 
reflects a lack of attention to the crucial distinction between Token Belief Formation 
Processes and Belief Formation Process Types. 
I have already discussed concerns stemming in a more direct fashion from the shape 
of the CPS. Here I have tried to push a complementary line of criticism by bringing the 
Generality Problem into discussion of the CPS. The CPS only assigns indicator value to 
knowledge that is the result of “methods” that meet certain criteria. Unfortunately, without 
a solution to the Generality Problem, stating these criteria seems difficult, and finding 
unique BFPTs for a given belief such that we could find Reliabilist knowledge to assess by 
the lights of the CPS seems impossible. Again, my aim has not merely been to rehearse 
well-known problems for the Reliabilist research program, but to point out that one of these 
issues in particular throws up a significant second roadblock for proponents of a response 
like the CPS to Reliabilism’s Value Problem. 
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Chapter 4: Understanding 
4.1 Kinds of Understanding 
Having completed the negative component of the project by suggesting some 
difficulties involved in the Reliabilist’s attempt to convincingly explain epistemic value, 
I’d like to turn now to my positive proposal. While Goldman and Olsson show that there 
is a way for the Reliabilist to show that their analysis of knowledge has more value than 
mere true belief, it isn’t clear that they have satisfyingly responded to the Primary Value 
Problem. If one takes the Tertiary Value Problem seriously, it is likely that their approach 
will seem wanting. This leaves us in a difficult position. We could abandon Reliabilism as 
a theory of knowledge on value theoretic grounds, as Zagzebski seems keen to. We could 
also try to explain away the epistemic value intuition, as Goldman seems to suggest we 
should.88 Neither approach is fully satisfactory. As an alternate proposal, I’d like to suggest 
we finally consider a move proposed in chapter one: retreating from the Guiding Intuition 
to the Weak Guiding Intuition. Specifically, I’d like to consider the possibility that 
Understanding is the state best suited to capture what Kvanvig and others hoped to recover 
from knowledge.  
“Understanding” is in wide use. It has moral, linguistic, and epistemic uses, at least. 
Here we are interested in the epistemic uses of the term. It’d be appealing if we could offer 
a persuasive, unified account of understanding in its epistemic guise, but most attempts so 
far seem to focus on either propositional or objectual understanding. I am interested in 
Understanding because I think it is a familiar, important feature of our epistemic lives, and 
one that affords an opportunity to sketch a relation between an agent and a content that is 
sophisticated in the way that the most promising ‘thin’ theories of knowledge are not. If 
                                                
88 See footnotes 18 and 60.  
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we can find a different propositional attitude that recovers much of what the swampers 
want to say about knowledge, we may be able to hold up these epistemic achievements 
without upsetting work in the theory of knowledge. 
There are familiar non-epistemic uses of understanding, as well as epistemic uses 
that differ in terms of their superficial structure. While some claims take the form “S 
understands that P,” others take a different form, where understanding takes a (non-
propositional) noun phrase as its complement, for example, calculus. I’ll call the first 
propositional understanding and the second objectual understanding. The 
straightforwardly propositional uses are much better understood. There are promising 
analyses of these on offer in terms of knowledge.89 An analysis in terms of knowledge is 
very appealing, as an opportunity to leverage our existing epistemic machinery. The 
received view of propositional understanding does just that, while borrowing from other 
sources as well. On one version of this view, to understand that P is to know why P. On 
another, understanding P requires knowing some R, such that R explains P. These views 
are built to capture the idea that understanding is knowing why. What is it to understand 
that it is wrong to burn cats for fun? One tempting view is that this understanding just is 
knowledge why recreational cat-burning is wrong. Despite the lively debate over the best 
version of this view of propositional understanding, it is unclear how to apply this theory 
to the objectual uses.  
One cause for concern for the propositional cases of epistemic understanding is that 
their analysis in terms of knowledge seems to open the door to cases of junk (propositional) 
understanding. Whatever is objectionable about the person on the lonely beach counting 
up grains of sand seems to be objectionable about someone who accumulates 
                                                
89 See e.g. Grimm (2014). 
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understanding by affirming to themselves that, for example, this sock is in the dresser 
because I put it there after washing it, and this sock is in the dresser because I put it there 
after washing it, and so on.  
While proponents of such views of propositional understanding are keen to remind 
us that on their view understanding is a special kind of knowledge only insofar as it has a 
special subject matter, and not in virtue of there being additional criteria which need to be 
satisfied, this seems to leave their proposals insufficiently distinct from knowledge to serve 
as the bearer of distinctive epistemic value in lieu of that state.  
There is less of a developing consensus about objectual understanding. Most 
discussions seem to start with the idea that the epistemic state of interest here relates an 
agent to a set of propositions, individuated by something like relevance. Theories diverge 
over whether or not an agent can understand some domain if their knowledge of (the 
relevant part of) the set of propositions involved is only partial, or if some of their relevant 
beliefs are false. It’s helpful to think about a more concrete kind of case. How much of 
which epistemic goods (knowledge, justification, true belief, etc.) does a chef need to 
accrue, and with regard to which propositions, before it becomes appropriate to attribute 
understanding of, e.g., baking, to that chef? Is one false belief about baking sufficient to 
preclude the chef’s understanding?  
To sum up our survey thus far, I’ll offer a small chart that takes advantage of two 
fundamental distinctions in order to break up the logical space. With these in view, it is 
clear which kinds of theory are well-suited to which linguistic data. It also dramatizes the 
reasons why a simple, unified analysis of epistemic understanding  would be surprising. 
We can distinguish singularly propositional from non-singularly propositional epistemic 
states by appeal to the nature of the content those states relate agents to. We can also 
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distinguish factive and non-factive attitudes by appeal to the propositions that can stand in 
the relevant relations.  
Unsurprisingly, the received view of propositional understanding sits in the top left 
quadrant of our chart, as this view reduces understanding to knowledge, and so analyzes 
propositional understanding in terms that are factive. Minority views according to which it 
is possible to understand a false proposition lie in the lower-left quadrant. The right column 
contrasts two approaches to objectual understanding: on one view, all the propositions in 
the set agents are related to must be true. On the other this constraint is not in place. 
 
 (Singularly) Propositional Non-Singularly Propositional 
(Directly) 
Factive 
Received view of propositional 
understanding 
Objectual understanding of sets of 
facts only 
Non-Directly 
Factive 
Propositional understanding of 
falsehoods possible 
“Robust Objectualism”90 
 
Table 1: Theoretical approaches to epistemic understanding. 
4.2 On Objectual Understanding 
In this section I’ll sketch the view of objectual understanding that I prefer, and note 
some difficulties with the project. At this stage, the topic is ripe for inquiry, and although 
the general approach to the objectual understanding seems promising and well-motivated, 
a completed analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is not forthcoming, 
though some possible necessary conditions will be discussed. I do think we have enough 
of a proposal together to see the general shape of the theory of objectual understanding and 
appreciate why it would serve well in a partnered role as a state responsive to the Weak 
                                                
90 The term here is due to Khalifa (2017). 
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Guiding Intuition with a theory of knowledge like Reliabilism, but the details of a theory 
of objectual understanding are unsettled, for now.  
 On my view, objectual understanding is a doxastic propositional attitude, but it is 
not a singular propositional attitude. Understanding in this sense is a relation between an 
agent and a topic or content construed as a set of believed propositions of cardinality at 
least greater than one. I do not endorse a truth requirement for membership in the set, or an 
ordering requirement on which some special subset of propositions in the group must be 
true, justified to some threshold, or meet other requirements. Some sufficiently high 
percentage of the members of the set must be true, and there are good reasons to think that 
there is a content-based restriction on which subjects or topics can be understood. On my 
view agents who understand a subject generally ought to be able to defend their relevant 
beliefs, manifest an associated skill or capacity, or explain the object of their 
understanding, although we can furnish counterexamples to each of these constraints. 
Finally, I believe that such a view of objectual understanding hews closely to the ordinary 
concept of epistemic understanding in its objectual use, and is well-suited to satisfy the 
Weak Guiding Intuition as the doxastic attitude that bears distinctive epistemic value. In 
the remainder of this section I will try to explain and defend each of these points in turn. 
First, the non-singularly propositional nature of objectual understanding. Recall 
that we are interested in the state attributed by utterances like “Jane understands calculus.” 
Although it is possible to defend a view on which there is just one conjunctive or otherwise 
complex proposition that Jane understands, her relationship to which captures her 
understanding of calculus, this view seems like a mere curiosity. If two agents each 
understood calculus but differed doxastically would we then be forced to adopt a 
polysemous account of “calculus”? Besides, such an utterance can be perfectly apt even of 
agents who make occasional errors, coming to false beliefs about calculus through the use 
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of their existing mathematical belief formation methods. It is far simpler to imagine Jane’s 
understanding as a matter of her bearing a group of doxastic attitudes to a group of 
propositions rather than taking her to bear one attitude to a massive proposition that 
encapsulates all her calculus thoughts while also bearing contrary attitudes to other 
contents, as in the case of false belief due to error. 
Should we require that all the propositions in the set be true? Scientific cases seem 
to suggest that we shouldn’t. Surely Newton, in developing his physics, improved his 
understanding of motion. This is close to a paradigm case of objectual understanding. 
Nevertheless, given what we now know about the Newtonian mechanics, any too zealous 
adherence to that theory at least skirts endorsing falsehoods. For a less radical example, 
consider the master woodworker discussed earlier, or the chef mentioned just above. Surely 
one false but relevant belief does not suffice to overturn one’s understanding of a subject 
matter. For preface-paradox type reasons, any factivity constraint would threaten to 
eliminate objectual understanding altogether, or reduce it in extension to the extraordinarily 
doxastically cautious. And this would do a great deal of violence to the commonsense 
concept of understanding we are out to capture. 
This next point is delicate. Given that it seems we must allow some false beliefs to 
co-exist with objectual understanding of a subject, we need some means to limit the objects 
of understanding. If we don’t, we risk being in the awkward position of trying to hold up 
this particular epistemic state as being specially valuable but without a way to rule out tarot 
card reading, astrology, and other obviously bankrupt enterprises. Two strategies suggest 
themselves. First, one could attempt to give a characterization (or a laundry-list) of the 
features of a subject or topic that preclude it’s being understood in the laudatory sense 
we’re currently interested in. A second approach would be to try to locate as a necessary 
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condition some central feature, perhaps some perspicuous propositions within the set of 
propositions understood, with a character that ruled out the inappropriate topics.  
I’m skeptical that we will be able to furnish a non-ad hoc list of forbidden topics or 
that the appropriate objects of understanding are structured in a way that would make 
finding similar central propositions plausible. Perhaps one needs to know something about 
the chain rule in order to understand calculus. But objects of understanding can be singled 
out at varying degrees of fineness of grain. Just as one might understand baking, one might 
understand breadmaking, or sourdough particularly, or the history of sourdough in a certain 
region of France in the eighteenth century. As we shift from one scale to another, it seems 
likely that the propositions that are central to an agents understanding of related topics will 
shift. This suggests that locating an agent-independent central core, even for one topical 
area, will be difficult, and so seems to suggest that any injunction to use a core content to 
determine whether or not a subject or topic is understandable is misguided.  
Whether we understand this as support for the idea that we ought to adopt a laundry-
list approach to the extent of understanding or not, there does seem to be one feature that 
rules a topic out: sufficiently deep or widespread inconsistency. Certainly the Newtonian 
mechanics can be understood, false though they may be, but it is difficult to imagine 
someone understanding that vaccines cause autism. Any body of belief that contained a 
sufficiently large proportion of falsehoods might be impossible to understand for just that 
reason. But it seems important that genuine understanding requires more than just a group 
of related true beliefs, or even bits of knowledge. They need to be related to each other in 
the right way. Understanding generally seems to be connected with abilities like the ability 
to explain, defend, or demonstrate. While such abilities are far too psychologically 
demanding to feature in plausible accounts of knowledge, they seem to be the very markers 
of understanding.  
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None of these capacities seems necessary in order to understand a subject, though. 
While the general connection between understanding and ability seems relatively robust, it 
is easy to picture someone who understands a concept but, perhaps due to an illness or 
some other dysfunction, is unable to put their doxastic attitude to practical purposes. 
Though one might understand perfectly well why this piece of gnarled timber will not serve 
for a given project, they could be incapable of expressing this understanding. So it would 
seem to be a mistake to tie the epistemic state too tightly to any particular practical capacity. 
Could these capacities function as sufficient conditions for understanding? It may depend 
on the details. It seems possible that one person might be able to explain a concept they fail 
to understand by parroting the speech of another. But their capacity to explain does not in 
this case signal their understanding of the thing explained. One might reject that such an 
agent in fact can explain the relevant phenomena, but this seems like a linguistic dispute. 
This leaves us with one last issue before I attempt to briefly reiterate the reasons 
why understanding is more promising than knowledge when it comes to responding to the 
Weak Guiding Intuition. This issue has to do with a potential complaint or objection based 
on the fit between the Weak Guiding Intuition and objectual understanding. On the one 
hand, we might worry that the value of understanding won’t be distinctive, and so won’t 
vindicate the Weak Guiding Intuition. On the other we might worry that understanding is 
too recherche to fill this important role. I think the correct response to these worries is to 
emphasize our native familiarity with objectual understanding. Though the term of art 
reference to it is unfamiliar, the state we are after is widespread and widely sought after. 
While we could construct a stipulative propositional attitude which is related to 
understanding but formally different in some small way (this task would be easier if we 
could get a better grip on understanding itself) we might have the makings of an objection.  
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If such a state could be produced then it might be argued that understanding does 
not have its value distinctively. But this objection seems to me perfectly general. We could 
stipulate a near-duplicate of any proposed epistemic state with some minor alteration. This 
isn’t an objection to understanding filling this role but instead to any familiar doxastic 
attitude satisfying the Weak Guiding Intuition. According to this objector, the field of 
potential epistemic states is populous enough to preclude any one from standing out. But 
what this objection really seems to call out for is a clarification, and perhaps one that will 
help bridge the gap between my view and proponents of the view that the value of 
knowledge is exhaustive of the propositional attitude part of the full picture of epistemic 
value. It would be deeply unsatisfying to produce some unfamiliar, artificial state and hold 
that up as the doxastic attitude that represents special succes from the epistemic point of 
view. I do not think this would be a fair characterization of my proposal. Understanding, 
though under-theorized, is far from unfamiliar.   
To conclude, we’ve seen reason to think that insofar as we wanted to find out which 
doxastic attitude bore special epistemic value, we would need to distance ourselves from 
the instrumental value shared by most true belief and knowledge, among other epistemic 
states. Our emphasis on finding a state that has a unique value led us towards 
understanding, which we sketched in a way that made the features of that state that were 
inappropriate in the theory of knowledge, like a connection to reflection and offering 
reasons or explanations, stand out. It is just these features that make understanding a 
plausible candidate to fill this role. It is somewhat revisionary to deny that knowledge holds 
pride of place among the doxastic attitudes. But offering understanding instead allows a 
more satisfying account of success from the epistemic point of view while allowing us to 
maintain the kind of compact theory of knowledge that the last several decades of inquiry 
have converged on.  
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There is much more to do: more needs to be said about the nature of mere true 
belief. The role of junk knowledge in this debate could well be clarified. Perhaps a more 
direct response to the Instrumentalist about epistemic value is available. Certainly much 
more work needs to be done trying to get a clearer picture of objectual understanding. But 
I hope to have at least offered some reasons that support the idea that it is our 
understanding, not our knowledge, that represents our greatest epistemic achievement.  
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